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Abstract: 
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Supervisor: Piret Ehin, PhD 
In the context of increasing geopolitical tensions, the identities and political loyalties 
of Russian-speaking minorities living outside of the historical homeland has become the focus 
of a growing body of research. Questions about the identities and political orientations of 
Russian-speakers are particularly pertinent in Estonia and Latvia, former Soviet republics that 
are now members of the EU and NATO, where Russian-speakers constitute a large share of 
the population. This research examines attitudes towards Estonian security and defence policy 
among the Russian-speaking youth in Estonia through the theoretical lens of transnationalism 
and triadic nexus models. The central hypothesis is that young Russian-speakers’ attitudes 
toward security and defence vary as a function of citizenship, level of identification with 
Estonia (as opposed to the ethnocultural homeland) and individual integration into Estonian 
society. This hypothesis is tested with qualitative analysis based on interviews of the target 
group. The interviews cover 25 members of the Russian-speaking community in Estonia, 
collecting information about their affinity to Estonia and Russia and measuring attitudes 
toward the key aspects of Estonian security and defence policy. The examination of the 
attitudes and personal reasons of the respondents show that self-identity, social and cultural 
background of Estonian young Russian-speaker can significantly determine one’s attitudes 
toward security and defence policy. Respondents with stronger affinity to Estonia show more 
supportive attitudes toward national security and defence, than their counterparts with stronger 
affinity to Russia. The results of this research shed light on the weaknesses of Estonian societal 
resilience and can help governmental actors to redirect integration policy in the more effective 
way.  
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Introduction 
 
After the end of Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, over 25 million ethnic Russians 
found themselves living abroad. (Koslowski, 2006) The collapse of the Soviet Union changed 
not only geographical borders in Eastern Europe, but also the social status of Russian-speakers 
in many post-Soviet countries. Notwithstanding the geopolitical changes, many Russian-
speakers remained socially and culturally affiliated with their ethnocultural homeland. Many of 
them still have relatives in Russia, or other post-Soviet states. Cross-border communication with 
relatives is still relevant for many families. In addition to this, the cultural space for Russian-
speakers tends to differ from that of natives. Formally living in one country, socially and 
culturally Russian-speakers tend to live in transboundary spaces, somewhere in the middle 
between their ethnocultural homeland and host states. Due to several reasons, attitudinal 
integration of Russian-speaking minorities is far from ideal in many post-Soviet countries. One 
of these reasons is that linguistic cleavages that are part of the legacy of Soviet rule remain a 
significant problem, such as in the Baltic States and particularly in Estonia, where by the end of 
the Soviet period almost one third of the population was Russian-speaking.  
As a consequence of Soviet labour migration policy, the ethnic composition of Estonian 
society changed drastically during the 20th century. In 1945 3% of the population was comprised 
of non-Estonians, but by 1989 this had increased to 38%. Most newcomers during this period 
were of Slavic decent and were primarily industrial workers. (Kirch, M., & Kirch, A. 1995, 48) 
This made Estonia a country with one of the most diverse ethnic compositions in Europe. (ibid.)  
Notwithstanding, some positive dynamics in integration since 1991, such as higher proficiency 
in Estonian language among Russian-speakers and decrease of number of people without 
citizenship, Estonian society remains relatively segregated on a national and linguistic basis. 
(Siiner, 2006, 163). Ethno-linguistic divisions still pertain to all important spheres of society, 
including places of residence, housing conditions family formation, schools and labour market. 
(Tammaru, et al.,2014). Despite attempts by the Estonian government to promote social 
cohesion by addressing these ethnic and linguistic cleavages, the emphasis on the majority 
language and culture as a prerequisite for access to citizenship and formal membership during 
the period immediately after restoring of Estonian independence has led to alienation of 
Russian-speakers from Estonia and has led them to continue to identify with their external 
homeland of Russia. (Muiznieks, Rozenvalds & Birka, 2013). More recently, we have seen 
some positive changes in social cohesion, for example, younger generations of Russian-
speakers in Estonia perceive more symbolic importance of Estonian language and show higher 
language proficiency than the older generations. (Vetik, et al.,2015) There are also some 
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positive trends in strengthening of identification with Estonian state among non-Estonians. 
Nevertheless, there is still a growing perception of social and economic inequality among non-
Estonians and their support to Estonian state institutions is generally lower than among 
Estonians. (ibid.) Differences are especially notable in terms of the level of support for the 
Estonian defence institutions such as Defence Forces and Defence League. In addition to this, 
the attitudes towards Estonian membership in NATO and EU tend to be less positive among 
non-Estonians. 
One of the main pillars of Estonian security and defence policy is its membership in 
NATO and EU. Estonia in concert with Latvia and Lithuania from the very beginning of the 
post-Soviet era sought to join NATO and the EU as soon as possible. In October 1991 the 
speaker of the Estonian Parliament Ülo Nugis claimed that only NATO could guarantee the 
security of Estonia (Riim, 2006). The reason for such security concerns were primarily Russia’s 
foreign policy and its’ immediate proximity to Estonian borders. For Estonia and other Baltic 
states, membership in NATO meant being covered by the security umbrella against Russian 
geopolitical domination and hostile ambitions, via Article 5 (ibid.). Since Estonia was actively 
harmonizing own security police with NATO it was successfully accepted to the Alliance in 
2004 (ibid.) in the same year with other Baltic states. In addition to the NATO military 
contingent located in Estonia, which today numbers more than 1300 troops and regular air 
patrols, Estonia gained a strong western identity (Riim, 2006), that is opposite to the Soviet 
identity and may oppose Russia’s geopolitical interests. As a result of this, Russia has in the 
time since sought to mobilize Russian-speaking communities in the “near abroad” over concerns 
about national security and defence policy. These concerns have appeared ever more frequently 
in public discussions among Russian-speakers living in Russian-language media and cultural 
space in its neighbouring countries.  
The role of Russia and Russian-speakers in the conflicts in Transnistria, Georgia and 
Ukraine has created concern among the international community. There is extensive evidence 
that Moscow has taken different measures to support Russian-speakers abroad via visa-free 
policy, educational and language programmes, (including in the Baltic region) and 
communicate with Russian-speakers via state-sponsored media channels. The information that 
is offered by Russia’s state-sponsored media sources often contradicts to the information 
coming from local national media. This may lead to a lack of attitudinal coherence between 
native nations that are consuming national media and Russian-speakers who are exposed to 
Russia’s mass media. Growing tensions in relations between the West and Russia have raised 
public concern about the political moods of local Russian-speakers. The Baltic states, as 
members of both the EU and NATO must be especially attentive due to the fact that a significant 
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part of their populations are comprised of Russophones, who tend to prefer Russia’s mass media 
to national information channels. When Russia is perceived as a potential threat, pro-Russian 
attitudes among some Russian-speakers may conflict with national security and defence policy 
stances. Obviously, in case of an armed conflict the lack of coherence among the population 
will decrease national defence capabilities. This makes attitudes of the Russian-speaking 
community toward national defence and security an important topic of research. 
Several studies (Kivirähk, 2017) have found that the general attitudes toward Estonian 
security and defence policy are less positive among Russian-speakers than with native 
Estonians. However, the reasons for the lack of attitudinal integration towards national defence 
and security are not well researched yet. Hypothetically, greater social, cultural and economic 
integration should lead to greater attitudinal integration, which is becoming essential in issues 
related to national defence and security. On the contrary, the greater affinity to the ethnocultural 
homeland and social and cultural estrangement from the host state can cause a lack of 
understanding and support for national policies. This might be especially relevant in the case of 
Russian-speakers in Estonia and national security and defence policy, taking into consideration 
the current geopolitical situation and different views of Estonia and Russia on a range of 
international issues. Recent studies conducted in Estonia provide some proof that emotional 
attachment to Estonia is stronger among Russian-speakers with Estonian citizenship, compared 
to those without any citizenship or with Russian citizenship. (Vetik and Helemäe, 2011). From 
this, we can assume that the more formally and socially integrated a person is, the closer one 
feels to the nation and country of living and as a result, the more similar their views would be 
to the native majority of the population. However, there is not enough evidence that the less 
integrated person would show greater unloyalty to national policies. As a result, there remains 
a gap in knowledge on how integration to host state and affinity to ethnocultural homeland could 
influence attitudinal integration, especially in such a sensitive topic as security and defence 
policy. 
Related to the above, the factors that may affect the national affinity of Russian-speaking 
youth, their self-identity, cultural and social background are becoming an especially important 
topic of research. Integration of Russian-speaking youth determines long-term effects on social 
cohesion.  Studies show that Russian-speaking youths who have Estonians among their circle 
of friends feel stronger affinity to the society, compared to first-generation Russians who have 
no close contacts with Estonians. (ibid.). Another important factor is language proficiency in 
the host language, which creates a solid ground for better economic conditions, hence closer 
relations to the state. Estonian language proficiency determines youth opportunities for finding 
higher-status employment. In Estonia, bilingual Russians are usually more successful, 
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especially in the first months after leaving school. In contrast, monolingual Russians have 
almost no opportunities to enter high-status stable jobs. (Lindemann and Kogan,2013). Young 
Russian-speakers have much better conditions to learn language and integrate to Estonian 
society than their parents, who had no chance to learn Estonian language in schools. 
Nevertheless, we do not know how it affects the attitudinal integration of youth, which is 
becoming quite volatile and unpredictable if we speak about people who grew up in a Russian 
social and informational environment, but were born and lived in Estonia, and may never have 
even been to Russia. Furthermore, Russian-speaking youth do not only play an important role 
in societal cohesion in Estonia, but they can also be potential national defenders in case of 
military conflict in the years to come, making their attitudinal integration even more relevant 
for Estonian defence and security. As a result, the attitudinal integration of Russian-speaking 
youth to Estonian security and defence policy is a research topic of both theoretical and practical 
importance and is thus the central topic of this thesis.  
In particular, I will examine the attitudes of Russian-speaking youth in Estonia toward 
Estonian defence and security policy. The central hypothesis is that young Russian-speakers’ 
attitudes toward security and defence vary as a function of citizenship, level of identification 
with Estonia (as opposed to the ethnocultural homeland) and individual integration into 
Estonian society. This work is going to search the answer to the question: how and to what 
extent does an individual’s affinity to Estonia and Russia determine attitudinal integration of 
Russian-speaking youth in the field of defence and security? The thesis is going to examine if 
such factors as self-identification, language proficiency or citizenship can determine attitudes 
toward security and defence policy. The hypothesis will be tested by qualitative analysis based 
on deep semi-structured interviews of the target group. The interviews cover 25 members of the 
Russian speaking community in Estonia, collecting information about their affinity to Estonia 
and Russia and measuring attitudes toward the key aspects of Estonian security and defence 
policy. 
The thesis is structured as follows. It has two main chapters. The first chapter describes 
the theoretical framework of transnationalism that emphasizes the phenomenon of 
inbetweenness of ethnic minorities flanked by a host country and the ethnocultural homeland. 
The chapter gives an overview of Brubaker’s Triadic Nexus model as a form of transnationalism 
and speaks about the applicability of the model in the Estonian context. The second chapter 
analyses the Estonian security and defence policy and the general attitudes of population 
towards it. The chapter contains an overview of Russian-speakers in Estonia, their linguistic 
and national background. The empirical part of the chapter explains the research design, data 
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and methodology and contains the categorical analysis of collected data, elaborating on main 
findings. 
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1. Ethnic minorities between host country and ethnocultural homeland: 
insights from transnationalism 
1.1 Transnationalism 
 
Nowadays, most countries are culturally diverse. There are over 180 independent states 
in world with 600 living languages groups and over 5000 nationalities. It is hardly possible that 
all citizens of one state will share just one language and belong to same ethnic group. (Kymlicka, 
1995) In this situation arguments and conflicts over language rights, autonomy, land, citizenship 
etc. are almost inevitable. There are various theories and models for making sense of the position 
of ethnic minorities and assessing their degree of integration into host society, such as 
acculturation (Berry & Sam, 1997), assimilation (Nee & Alba, 2012), cosmopolitanism and 
multiculturalism. (Modood, 2013). Varying from assimilation to multiculturalism the views on 
position of ethnic minorities can be quite diverse. One of the most radical ways of interaction 
between immigrants and host society is assimilation. This is a social transformation process in 
which immigrants become full participants of the “institutions” of the host society and identify 
completely with that society (Sayegh & Lasry, 1993). Quite opposite to assimilation is 
cosmopolitanism, which appears as a consequence of the process of globalization. Based on the 
refusal to recognize the priority of national traditions and culture over the traditions and cultures 
of other countries and peoples, it declares that any manifestations of patriotism are considered 
as primitive forms of human consciousness, while common interests and values of all mankind 
are considered as a priority. (Gizatova, Ivanova, & Gedz, 2017, 27) A less radical model of 
coexistence in multicultural society is Kymlicka’s (1995) multiculturalism. The core idea of 
Kymlicka’s multiculturalism is that essential values of national minorities related to their culture 
and identity have to be supported by special rights. The host state should establish social policies 
that provide national minorities with conditions so that they can preserve the basic values of 
their cultures. It would reward national minorities for the need of integration. The special rights 
for national minorities should equalize the living standards between minorities and majorities 
of population. However, Klymlicka’s model of multiculturalism is applicable rather for 
indigenous minorities. The approach to “new” minorities, such as immigrants can be quite 
opposite. For instance, according to “take-and-give theory” for the chance to become more 
prosperous in their host country than they would be in their birth state, immigrants owe it to the 
host country to adopt the national culture and language. (Kloss, 1971, 254).  
However, none of above mentioned theories fit the Estonian case, as the situation with 
the Russian-speaking community is more complicated. In the case of Estonia, the Russian-
11 
 
speaking community can hardly be called indigenous, except the Orthodox Old Believers1. 
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to call the most of Russian-speakers currently living in Estonia 
immigrants in the classical understanding of the term. Most of the Estonian Russian-speakers 
did not move to Estonia intentionally as to another country. Most of them moved or where 
relocated in Soviet times, when de facto there was no border. After living for a certain time in 
Estonia under Soviet occupation (or even being born here) in 1991 they suddenly were living 
in a ‘different’ country - independent Estonia. They ‘moved’ to another country without actually 
leaving their house. Twenty-seven years later, the Russian-speaking community in Estonia is 
not fully integrated or assimilated. In addition to this, notwithstanding re-established borders, 
many Russian-speakers continue to maintain social ties with their relatives and friends in 
Russia. Moreover, living now in Estonia, they rather belong to Russian cultural space than 
Estonian. Such type of interaction between host state, ethnocultural homeland and national 
minority depicts an alternative theory, that of transnationalism.  
Transnationalism theory speaks about cultural hybridity and multi-positional identities 
of people living in one state continuing to have close ties with another. (Smith & Guarnizo, 
1998). Formerly it was considered that migrants a) must be assimilated or b) live in a 
multicultural system. In the beginning of 1990s Glick Schiller et al. (1992) came up with a new 
paradigm of international migration based on concepts of “transmigrants” and 
“transnationalism”. In the frames of this paradigm “transnationalism” is a social process in 
which migrants create social spaces that cross geographical, cultural and political borders. 
Migrants become “transmigrants” when they keep and develop cross-border family, economic, 
social, organizational and political relations. In theory transmigrants are part of more than one 
community. Pries (1997) concludes, that the constant flow of people, goods and information, 
caused by globalization processes marked the beginning of this new concept of migration. The 
new concept denies old-school binary opposition: integration vs. new ethnic minorities. 
Nowadays migrants are not always orientated to integration, as they live in both the kin and host 
state where they create new transnational social spaces. 
According to transnationalism, a member of the ethnic minority can identify with both 
the new and historic homeland and have important ties to both. They create new 
interconnections between communities based not on geographical borders, but on territories 
where people of their nationality live. Guest workers (people from one country who live and 
work for a time in another country), often have a quite transitional style of living. Guest workers 
                                                                
1 Russian-speakers, who settled mainly on the western coast of Lake Peipsi escaping from the persecution of 
authorities and the Russian Orthodox Church in the late 17th century after split of the Russian Orthodox Church into 
an official church and the Old Believers movement. (Plaat, 2005) 
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create connections with local communities in new places of temporal residence, constantly 
keeping connections with relatives and friends from home as well as formal ties with the kin 
state (Кайзер & Бредникова, 2004). In these circumstances the identity of the minority can be 
divided between host and kin states. Transmigrants take part of their identity from the host state, 
which differentiates them from their compatriots in their ethnocultural homeland, and part of 
their identity from the kin state, differentiating them from natives of their state of residence. For 
them the country of origin can become a source of cultural and national identity and country of 
residence a source of legal identity. (Vertovec, 2004, 28). By accepting local norms and legal 
order transmigrants tend to associate themselves with a country of residence, especially for the 
second generation of migrants, who may never have even been to the ethnocultural homeland 
of their parents. For them, the living standards, laws and norms of the kin state can be strange 
and unfamiliar, while the settings of their country of residence would be much more ‘homelike’. 
Nevertheless, modern telecommunication technologies let them conveniently live in the cultural 
space of their ethnocultural homeland without leaving the host state. Via telephone or internet 
connections they can maintain constant communication with their friends and relatives abroad. 
(Vertovec, 2004) This can lead to a closer affinity to their ethnic community than to the society 
where they actually live. All things considered, members of the ethnic minority can have dual 
identity split between the new and historic homeland.  
The phenomenon of transnationalism has led to a growing concern in international 
security and geopolitical discussions. Leading commentators argued whether dual national 
identity, especially when it is supported by dual citizenship can produce competing loyalties, 
create a security threat, impede immigrant integration, increase international instability or 
violate equality. (Hansen & Weil, 2002) Transmigrants with dual national identity can play 
different roles in international relations, stability and security, depending on geopolitical 
circumstances, position of kin and hosting state and their interconnections. Transmigrants can 
play key roles in war and peace building or can create mass protests and be the reason for 
consciousness-raising. For instance, after capture of Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan, within a 
day Kurds organized mass demonstrations all around the world, bringing Kurdish issues to 
global attention. (Vertovec, 2004, 34) In the current fluid, globalised geopolitical context, 
transmigrants tend to retain not only social and financial links to their homeland, but also 
political ones. Many sending countries consider their emigres as important sources of 
remittances, investment capital, and votes and support maintenance of transnational ties. (Negel, 
2002). In some cases, this may lead to the situation where, a national minority can claim political 
membership in more than one state and become a political and economic actor for both host and 
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kin state. (ibid.) Problems can arise if the economic and political interests of host and kin states 
conflict with each other.  
This is also partly applicable to the Estonian case. Estonian Russian-speakers can hardly 
claim political membership in Russia, neither can they express vital interest to Russia’s politics. 
However, being politically interested in Estonian Russian-speakers Russia supports 
maintenance of transnational ties. Some Russian-speakers answer with political loyalty to 
Russia’s efforts. For example, even though mainstream media and political discourse in Estonia 
portrays Putin’s regime in Russia in a negative light, 94% of votes of Russian citizens living in 
Estonia were in favour of President Vladimir Putin during the 2018 Russian presidential election 
(Cavegn, 2018). Similar political behaviour sometimes has different incentives for people of 
the same nation living in kin and host states. While in Russia support of Putin could show 
contentment with the current regime, in Estonia, support of Putin could also indicate protest 
against the Estonian political agenda, as it contradicts the interests of the current regime in 
Russia. In this case, both options are beneficial to current political elites of the kin state. 
However, we need to note here, that it would be unreasonable to declare all Russian-speakers 
in Estonia as supporters of Putin, since the 28,077 people voted for Putin make up only 7% of 
the Russian-speaking population of Estonia. Generally, election turnout was not high. Only 
28,077 out of nearly 83,000 Russian citizens eligible to vote participated in the 18 March 
election. (ibid.). This shows that general interest in Russia’s policy among Estonian Russian-
speakers is not high.   
To conclude, the position of national minorities in a host state may be various. Due to 
several reasons mentioned above, in Estonia it took primarily a transnational form, where 
Russian-speakers have double or competing identity with formal ties with Estonia and cultural 
with Russia. In terms of geopolitical tensions between Estonia and Russia the political stances 
of Russian-speakers become especially interesting as a topic for public discussions and research. 
Political views of minorities in relation to kin and hosting states can be quite various and often 
reasoned by pragmatic interests or ideological principles independent from either state. The 
interrelation of these three actors are explained by Brubaker (1996) in his Triadic Nexus model 
– the subject of the next section. 
1.2 Triadic nexus model 
Transformation of regional borders and internal Soviet labour migration significantly 
changed the traditional territorial settlement of different ethnic groups. When the system broke 
down, it caused tremendous intercultural confusion, even resulting in bloody conflicts. 
(Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia) Many people unwillingly became transnational, 
14 
 
having homes and work in one post-Soviet republic and families and friends in another. In the 
meantime, many CEE states after communism engaged in the process of nation-building based 
on the model of an ethnic nation-state. (Kallas, 2016, 9). In this situation, national minorities 
appeared between nationalizing states in which they physically lived and the external homelands 
to which they belonged due to ethnonational affinity though not by legal citizenship (Brubaker, 
1996, 5). The three elements: nationalising states, national minorities and external national 
homelands –compose Brubaker’s triadic nexus model (Brubaker, 1995). In this model, 
nationalising states, national minorities and external national homelands have their own 
interests and act according to their own aims, but all elements are bound together in a single and 
highly interdependent relational nexus. (ibid.) 
The first part of the nexus is the nationalising state, that seek to build a national-centric 
state with a certain level of social cohesion and integration of minorities. In his model, Brubaker 
(2005) also speaks about states with dynamic political stances, which are states that seek to 
become nation-states for a particular nation, but have not reached this condition yet, or not to a 
sufficient degree. The nationalising states are properly and legitimately destined to promote the 
language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing, and political hegemony of the 
nominally state-bearing nation (Brubaker, 2005, 114). The projects of nationalisation are 
justified and may be even virtually obligatory in some contexts.  It is especially relevant in case 
of new states, as for instance almost all Soviet and Yugoslav successor states, that due to 
historical, institutional and ethno-demographic reasons are closely identified with one particular 
ethnocultural nation.  (ibid.) 
Another part of the nexus are the external national homelands. Brubaker (1995) speaks 
about the external national homeland as a constructed political category.  In his model, the 
external national homeland is not necessarily the actual homeland of the national minority or 
their ancestors’.  The external national homeland is a state, where political elites consider people 
of the same nation living in other states as their own ethnonational kin that in some sense 
belongs to their state. (Brubaker, 2005, 110).  The external national homelands feel an obligation 
to these people and thus should monitor their conditions, promote their welfare, assert their 
interests and protect the rights of “their” ethnonational kin in other states.  (ibid.) This active 
position of the external national homeland can take different forms, varying from citizenship 
privileges for “returning” compatriots to the efforts to influence the policies of host states that 
can affect their ethnonational kin. 
The third element of Brubaker’s (2005) triadic nexus model is the national minority 
itself. In this model, national minority is a dynamic political stance, not a static 
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ethnodemographic condition. The political stances of national minorities usually include the 
claim of belongingness to a different ethnonational group from the dominant nation, demands 
for state recognition of this distinct ethnonational group and assertion of certain cultural or 
political rights for the ethnonational group.  (ibid.) Depending on the context, the national 
minority can take different positions in the triadic nexus interrelation between external national 
homeland and host (nationalising) state. Some members of the national minority may see it 
important to demonstrate their loyalty to the host state, while others may seek patronage or 
protection from the external national homeland or international organizations. (ibid.) Members 
of a national minority can hold diverse positions in the political arena of host state, they can 
fully participate in state institutions, belong to government coalitions or represent separatist and 
noncooperative movements. In different circumstances the political interests of a national 
minority can vary from demand for administration and education in their own language to full 
political or territorial autonomy.  In this situation national minorities may have their own 
political stances separate from the interests of external national homelands or host states. On 
the contrary, they might even pursue ideas of greater autonomy from both states – in other 
words, they might see themselves as being part of both states or separate from both. 
All things considered, the political stances of different triadic nexus elements can go in 
contrast with each other creating conflicts of views and positions. Stjepanović (2015) describes 
situations where minority groups do not necessarily self-identify with the ethnocultural 
homeland (especially in terms of political claims) but are nonetheless targeted and ‘claimed’ by 
the ethnocultural homeland as its own ethnonational kin. This can cause alienation of national 
minority from the external ethnocultural homeland (kin-state) and lead to greater affinity with 
a host state. (See Figure 1.) 
 
Figure 1. Claimed co-ethnics and the triadic nexus. (Stjepanović, 2015, 144) 
An example of the triadic nexus dilemma in practice could be the case of Hungarian 
Status Law, which was Viktor Orbán’s FIDESZ government initiative to support Hungarians 
living abroad. The law was intended to protect and promote the Hungarian culture, discourage 
brain-drain, and maintain close links between Hungary and Hungarians abroad. (Kemp, 2006) 
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The most outspoken critics of this Law were Slovakia and Romania as they have the largest 
Hungarian minority communities. (ibid.) In some sense support of this Law meant accusation 
of Slovak and Romanian governments as not doing a good job of protecting and promoting the 
rights and interests of Hungarian minorities under their jurisdiction. As a result, “The Status 
Law put Hungarian minorities in neighbouring states in a bind.” (Kemp, 2006, 117). On the one 
hand, Hungarian national minorities benefited from this law. On the other hand, local Hungarian 
political elites in Slovakia and Romania did not want to break good relations with Slovak and 
Romanian governments. (ibid.) In this situation, the nationalising state, national minority and 
external national homeland are three different actors, with their own preferences and visions. 
Notwithstanding the stated intentions of the Hungarian government to improve the lives of its 
ethnonational kin in neighbouring countries, local Hungarian community did not share the 
views of their kin state.  
1.3 Applicability in the Estonian context 
The triadic nexus model well represents the situation in the Baltic States and particularly 
in Estonia, where Russian-speakers are a minority and the Russian Federation is the external 
homeland. Estonia can be a good example of a nationalising state, while the biggest national 
minority in Estonia is a constant target of influence of their ethnocultural homeland, that claims 
them as its own ethnonational kin. The closeness of the Russian-speaking region of Ida-Virumaa 
in Estonia to Russsia’s borders and the constant cross-border cultural and social communication 
aggravates the situation. This helps to create solid ground for strong transnational ties, while 
tensions between the host state and external national homeland put minorities in an especially 
complicated situation. Russophones in Estonia are now caught between the growing inclusive 
policy of Estonia and exhortations from Russia. (See Figure 2.) 
 
Figure 2. Estonian Russian-speakers between Estonia and Russia 
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During the time right after collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation was quite 
passive as a kin state in relation to Russian-speaking community in Baltic States. The situation 
has changed with the rise of Putin’s in Russia. Russia has become more active, trying to play 
the role of defender of Russian minority rights in neighbouring countries. Corresponding to the 
triadic nexus model, Russia feels an obligation and has the will to monitor the conditions, 
promote the welfare, assert the interest and protect the rights of Russians in other states. During 
the summit of Russian diplomats in July 2014 Putin directly stated that Russia “will continue to 
defend the rights of Russians, of our compatriots abroad, using everything we have in our 
arsenal.” (Shuster & Mcdonaldgibson, 2014). Leading commentators claim that via propaganda 
and diplomacy Russia has influenced Russian-speakers living abroad for political purposes—
for instance, to justify aggression in Transnistria, Georgia and Ukraine. (ibid.) In the Baltic 
region Russia has taken different measures to promote the use of Russian-language and support 
Russian-speakers. In response to the possible decline of the Russian language in the Baltic 
states, Russia’s government-sponsored foundation Russkiy Mir opened a Russian language 
centre in Estonia and two in Latvia in 2008. (Grigas, 2012) As Kallas (2016) states, Russia’s 
concept of Russkyi Mir clearly has a transnational characteristic, proclaiming the Russian nation 
divided by borders.  Furthermore, Moscow’s compatriot policy aims to mobilize ethnic feelings 
and stimulate affinity of Russian-speakers. In addition to this, Russian media sources tend to 
critically depict the national policies of the Baltic states, speaking about the ‘neo-Nazi threat’ 
and limitation of human rights, for example within national language and citizenship policies 
(Grigas, 2012). Russia as a kin state tries to be involved in the lives of their ethnonational kin 
not only ideologically, but also formally. Estonian residents without citizenship can travel to 
Russia without obtaining a Visa, Estonian students can be accepted to Russian universities by 
special compatriots’ quota and Russian citizens in Estonia can participate in Russian 
presidential elections in three cities (Tallinn, Tartu and Narva). All things considered, Russia 
has taken a quite active position as a kin state in relation to Russian-speakers in Estonia. 
After the collapse of the USSR Estonia started to build a national-centric state. “Estonia, 
as a newly independent state that embarked on a process of nation-building, bore all the 
characteristics of a nationalising state as defined by Brubaker.” (Kallas, 2016, 31) Brubaker 
(2011) explained Estonian nationalization as initially oriented towards protecting, 
strengthening, and empowering the core nation as a sharply bounded collective, but 
subsequently becoming more assimilationist and culturalist. Russian language was not accepted 
as an official language, which was a significant disadvantage for Estonian Russophones, 
because only 13% had knowledge of Estonian in 1991 (Kallas, 2016). In addition to this, they 
had no rights for automatic citizenship, and certificate of proficiency in Estonian language was 
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set as one of the requirements for obtaining citizenship. Hence, they could not vote in 
parliamentary elections, eliminating the chance that any purely Russophone party would be 
represented in the Estonian Parliament (Riigikogu). However, with economic growth, social 
stability and Europeanization, the nation-building process in Estonia has eventually taken a less 
exclusionary character towards Russian-speakers (Kallas, 2016). As a result, Estonia has taken 
several steps to integrate the Russian-speaking minority, including its Integration Programme 
with 4 sub-programmes: “Education”, “The education and culture of ethnic minorities”, “The 
teaching of Estonian to adults” and “Social competence” which was initiated in 2000. 
(Poleshchuk, 2001). To improve competitiveness in the labour market and integration of 
Russian-speaking youth it was decided that at least 60% of the curriculum of Russian schools 
in grades 10-12 would be taught in Estonian language. Although this may appear to be an effort 
at assimilation, the fact that 40% of the curriculum can still be taught in Russia is seen by 
Brubaker (2011) as a substantial nationalization of minority-language education because it is a 
retreat from earlier plans to fully abolish Russian-language instruction in secondary schools. 
Estonia actively supports ethnic cultural organisations reallocating financial sources from funds 
of the Ministry of Culture, non-Estonians’ Integration Foundation, Ministry of Education and 
the City of Tallinn. (Poleshchuk, 2001). Under the EU funded Estonian Language Training 
Programme, many adults have participated in language courses. Adult language trainings for 
police officers, local officials, the unemployed and special language classes at universities were 
also initiated. (ibid.) In addition to integration policies, the Estonian government has realized 
that media communication in Russian language is also important, because otherwise 
Russophones in Estonia will get only information from Russia’s channels. Nevertheless, it is 
hard to compete with them in terms of financing and quality. Launched in 2015, the state-
sponsored Estonian national broadcasting Russian language channel ETV+ is hardly getting 
popularity among Russian-speakers. (Emor, 2017). Overall, it can be concluded, that having 
features of a nationalizing state (accordingly to Brubaker (2011)) Estonia is moving towards 
higher inclusiveness of the Russian-speaking population and is attempting to increase its 
influence over local Russophones in response to growing activity of Russia’s compatriots’ 
policy.  
Russian-speakers in Estonia is also a clear example of a transnational community that 
retains close cultural and social ties with its ethnocultural homeland but has a certain level of 
affinity with the host state. Most Russian-speakers currently living in Estonia (or their 
parents/grandparents), except Orthodox Old Believers, arrived in the 20th century. The main 
wave of immigration from Russia took place after the WWII. However, there is some part of 
Russian residents that have Estonian roots coming from the first part of the twentieth century 
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and before. In 1934 92 656 Russians lived in Estonia, by 1959 there were 240 227 Russians and 
in 1989 474 834 or 30,3% of the total population. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
number decreased but still is very high compared to the situation before the Soviet occupation 
– 92 656 in 1934 and 351 178 in 2000. (Kuddo and Laas, 2002) The Russian-speaking 
population that emigrated to Estonia during Soviet times has met extraordinary change in their 
lives. As mentioned above, in 1991 without moving anywhere, they ‘moved’ to a different 
country, where their status has changed dramatically. Most of them moved to Estonia 
considering its’ territory a part of their homeland. The change of the regime meant that their 
status changed from citizen to ‘illegal’ immigrants almost overnight (Ehala, 2009). The nation-
centric agenda of Estonia did not decrease the gap between native Estonians and Russian-
speaking people.  
The Russian-speaking community in Estonia is quite diverse, representing different 
ethnic groups they still speak primarily one language. “According to the Census by The 
Statistics Estonia (REL 2011) the Estonian population is ethnically heterogeneous: among the 
total of the population 25% are Russians, 6.5% other nations, of whom more than half considers 
the Russian language their mother tongue (53.9%)” (Küün,2015). One the main factors that 
characterize a person’s national identity is their mother tongue. According to the Estonian 2000 
Census, 98,2% of Russophones considered Russian language their mother tongue. (Kuddo and 
Laas, 2002) 41,1% of Ukrainians considered Ukrainian as their mother tongue, but 56,8% 
Ukrainians living in Estonia considered that their mother tongue is Russian. Corresponding 
numbers for Belarusians living in Estonia are 28,7% and 69,7%. This shows, that Russophones 
in Estonia are not only Russians, but represent also other ethnic groups like Ukrainians and 
Belarusians. 58,9% of the Estonian population in 2000 were able to speak Russian as mother 
tongue or foreign language. (ibid.)  
Many Russian-speaking people in Estonia are not only using Russian language 
predominately in their daily lives but also prefer to consume Russia’s media channels and follow 
Russia’s pop culture. What puts the Russian-speaking community in a special situation is that 
the cultural space of their ethnonational kinstate is wider than the cultural space of the host 
country. Hence, there is often a wider option of movies, books and music in Russian language. 
In addition to this, not so long time ago they grew up and lived in Soviet, a predominately 
Russian cultural space distanced by the ‘iron curtain’ from western culture. For many, the media 
and cultural preferences have not changed in the past 25 years.  As long as there are available 
Russian language TV channels, newspapers and other information sources, many Russophones 
will not feel the need to consume Estonian media. In 2011 almost one third of Estonian Radio 
broadcasting was in Russian language. (Statistics Estonia, 2016). This creates segregation of 
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media consumption within the Estonian population. This is clearly seen in the daily share of 
viewing time of televension channels: in June 2017 Estonians primarily watched Estonian 
channels like Kanal 2 (21,9%), ETV (20,5%), TV3 (16,5%), but for non-Estonians the most 
popular channels were Russian channels like PBK (17,7%), NTV-World (16,2%) и RTR-Planet 
(12,7%) (Emor, 2017). The most popular Russian channel in 2017 was the First Baltic Channel 
(PBK) that took fourth place in total ratings on Estonian television. In contrast, the Russian 
language channel of the Estonian national broadcasting ETV+ had only 0,7% in June 2017. In 
this sense, many Russian-speakers living in Estonia are consuming Russia’s media, hence the 
information coming from Russia. In terms of this transnational media consumption, especially 
in times of geo-political tensions, people are appearing to be caught between the hammer and 
anvil, when Estonian and Russia are spreading messages that contradict each other. Many older 
Russophones sympathize with Russia, because they were born there and even after they moved 
to Estonia have lived in a predominantly Russian cultural and information space. Apparently, 
their ethnocultural homeland is now separated by the national border, but transnational bonds 
are still present.  
However, it is important to note that although Estonia’s Russian-speakers continue to 
maintain strong cultural and linguistic affiliations with Russia as their ethnocultural homeland, 
they often demonstrate suspicion towards Russia’s claims on them as compatriots. (Kallas, 
2016) First of all, not all Russian-speakers belong to the Russian ethnic group, many of them 
identify themselves with other ethnicities. Secondly, the younger generation of Russian-
speakers have only indirect cultural and linguistic affinity to Russia. Even speaking in the 
Russian language and following Russian modern culture, many of Russian-speaking youngsters 
have never been to Russia. As the current research shows, for many of them Russia is as foreign 
a country as any other. As such, there is no reason for them to accept the compatriot status. 
Russian-speaking youth born in Estonia instead consider Estonia as their home and not Russia. 
One of the latest examples of Estonian patriotic feelings among Russian-speaking youth can be 
found in the lyrics of popular Narva Russian-speaking rapper Stuf, who recently became popular 
after his song “Olen venelane” in which he sings in Estonian and Russian language that he is 
Russian but loves Estonia. (Stuf, 2017) 
All things considered Brubaker’s Triadic Nexus model (1996) is well depicted in the 
Estonian case. Here we have three actors, Estonia as a nationalising state, Russia as the 
ethnocultural homeland and Russian-speaking Estonians as a national minority caught between 
growing influence of host state and ethnocultural homeland. However, accordingly to 
Stjepanović (2015) Russia appears in the model rather as claimed ethnocultural homeland, as 
not all Russian-speakers feel affinity to Russia as to their own kin state. It is hard to say, what 
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determines the affinity and visions of Russian-speakers in Estonia since the reasons of their 
political stances are not well researched yet. The attempt to shed the light on this question will 
be addressed in the following chapters. 
1.4 Main theoretical expectations 
This research is going to seek to offer evidence of the transnational characteristics of 
Russian-speakers in Estonia. According to the theory of transnationalism, Russian-speakers 
living in Estonia maintain transboundary social ties and create a transnational cultural space, 
where they live geographically in Estonia, while still preserving close cultural and linguistic 
ties with Russia. The pertinent question here is whether cultural and social affinity to the kin 
state influence the attitudes of the transnational population towards security and defence policy 
of the host state, taking into consideration the uneasy geopolitical relations between the states.  
The main hypothesis here will be that the more Russian-speakers are socially and 
culturally integrated into Estonian society the more their attitudes towards Estonian security 
and defence policy will align with those of native Estonians. (see Figure.3)  
  
Figure 3. Hypothetical correlation of attitudes and affinity of Russian-speaking youth in 
Estonia 
For instance, the more a person is culturally and socially integrated to Estonian society, 
the more he/she would trust the Estonian Defence Forces, Defence League and support 
Estonian membership in NATO and the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence in Estonia. 
Nevertheless, these main expectations do not exclude, that the hypothesis could be 
disproved, because according to the Triadic Nexus model, national minority between the kin 
and host state may behave as an independent actor, accordingly to their own pragmatic interests 
or political views. Hence, the attitudes of Russian-speaking youth may appear to be 
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independent from the level of their affinity to Russia or Estonia. The analysis will give an 
answer to the main research question, how the closeness (affinity) to Estonia and Russia 
determine attitudinal integration of Russian-speaking youth in Estonia in the field of defence 
and security. 
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2. Attitudes of Estonia’s Russian-speakers towards Estonian security and 
defence policy 
This chapter speaks about Estonian security and defence policy looking on the Estonian 
National Security Concept and Defence Strategy. The overview is followed by general findings 
of Public Opinion and National Defence research conducted upon the order of the Estonian 
Ministry of Defence which reflects the general attitudes of the Estonian population toward key 
elements of Estonian security and defence policy. The second part of the chapter contains the 
methodology and empirical analysis of conducted interviews among young Russian-speakers 
on the topic of social/cultural affinity and Estonian security and defence policy. The chapter 
ends with the main empirical findings and conclusion of the conducted research. 
2.1 Overview of Estonian security and defence policy 
Current Estonian security and defence policy is strongly connected with Estonian 
international affairs and the perceived threat from the eastern neighbourhood. The historical 
background of the country has played a crucial role in how the current Estonian defence and 
security doctrine has been developed. Occupations of the 20th century and struggles to restore 
independence stimulated national will to develop and maintain strong defence capabilities and 
search for the allies in the West. The main documents that regulate Estonian security and 
defence policy are the National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia (NSC) and the 
National Defence Strategy (NDS). Being subject to approval by the Riigikogu, the NSC 
identifies the generalised goals, principles, and trends of security policy. (MOD, 2018) Being 
subject to approval by government, the National Defence Strategy, based on NSC identifies 
long-term and future-orientated plans of defence policy. (ibid.). In addition to active 
development of its own defence capabilities, Estonia maintains strong co-operation with NATO 
and the European Union. Estonia follows the principles of collective defence of NATO, 
Common European Foreign and Security Policy, and European Security and Defence Policy. 
(ibid.) 
According to the NSC, protection of Estonia’s independence and sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, constitutional order and public safety are the main objectives of Estonian security 
policy. (National security concept of Estonia, 2017). There is no difference how powerful or 
big the potential opponent is, Estonia will defend its’ integrity and sovereignty against any 
aggression regardless of the threat scenario. If some part of the Estonian territory is temporarily 
occupied, Estonian citizens would be supported and encouraged to participate in organised 
resistance. The NSC emphasizes the importance of a broad security concept (Integrated 
National Defence Concept), which implies the involvement and cooperation of all Estonian state 
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institutions, international allies and all sectors of society. Networks of civilian volunteers and 
public- private partnerships also play a vital role in this cooperation. (ibid.) In the event of an 
armed conflict, the entire Estonian population should be involved in immediate defence and 
counterattack. The NSC calls for participation of the entire society in defence, which is 
supposed to be ensured by the population’s high willingness to defend their country, widespread 
military training, and the large membership of the Estonian Defence League (the term will be 
explained further). However, the high willingness of the Estonian population to defend their 
country may be questionable, especially among Russian-speakers. Estonian defence policy is 
closely related to the position that Estonia holds in the international arena, sharing common 
values and visions with NATO and EU partners. According to NSC (2017) Estonia will continue 
to contribute to maintain world order based on international law. Estonia will contribute to 
deepen the solidarity of NATO and EU member states, increase the capabilities and 
effectiveness of diplomacy, strengthen the collective defence, develop independent defence 
capability, implement the comprehensive national defence concept, empower a cooperative 
security system, improve strategic communication, participate actively in international conflict 
prevention and crisis management, strengthen control of the country’s borders, improve 
society’s resilience, guarantee that constitutional institutions and state governance are reliable 
and resilient, and to improve the reaction of internal security authorities. (National security 
concept of Estonia, 2017). 
All these are needed due to the tense international security environment. (ibid.) Estonia 
realises that all threats connected to globalization influence Europe’s and Estonia’s security. 
The flows of migration caused by inefficient resolution of international conflicts and ideological 
and religious extremism aimed against the Western value space are affecting Estonia’s security 
as well. (ibid.) However, the main immediate threat to Estonia’s security primarily depend on 
the security situation in the Euro Atlantic region and the relations between its neighbouring 
countries. (ibid.) The NSC highlights the threat posed by Russia’s interest to restore its position 
as a ‘great power’. The tense relations between Russia and Estonia had a significant impact on 
development of Estonian security and defence policy. Immediately after restoration of 
independence Estonia protested the presence of Russian troops on its’ territory and actively 
started to build a nation state with ambitions to join the EU and NATO. As these developments 
conflicted with Russia’s interest in the region, they caused constant criticism by Russian 
political elites. After two nights of rioting in Tallinn caused by Estonia's decision to move a 
Soviet World War II memorial in 2007 Russia was accused in cyberattacks against Estonia 
(Bright, 2007) and violation of diplomatic law (Liik, 2007). Since that time Estonian-Russian 
relations have never been significantly improved and continue to be the main incentive for 
25 
 
Estonian stances in defence and security policy. Nowadays Russia is the only country mentioned 
in the Estonian NSC and NDS as a threat. Estonia is highly concerned about Russia’s efforts to 
strengthen its armed forces, increased military presence on the borders of NATO member states, 
including in the Baltic Sea region and on Estonia’s border. The NSC (2017) states that Russia 
implements unpredictable, aggressive and provocative policy, repeatedly violates airspace, and 
conducts offensive military exercises, generating instability. In addition to the immediate threat, 
the NSC indicates concern about changes in the global energy market and established structure 
of energy supply between the European Union and Russia, that may affect the Estonian 
economy. To deter Russian aggression Estonia works for greater unanimity and consistency in 
EU’s and NATO’s Russian policy (National security concept of Estonia, 2017). The National 
Defence Strategy (2011) states that a military attack on Estonia is highly unlikely, however, 
hybrid threats including attacks against energy, information and communication systems are 
still possible. (ibid.) Corresponding to the changing international security environment, the 
Estonian security concept has been expanded to include several new areas, such as propaganda 
and malevolent manipulations, which are considered as one of the main threats to security. 
Despite these concerns the NDS (2011) indicates that Estonia today is more secure than ever, 
but the threat of military attack cannot be ruled out altogether. 
In case of military attack Estonia’s military defence will rely on both NATO’s collective 
defence and its own military defence capability. In this scenario Estonian forces would initially 
defend regions and objects of strategic importance in order to allow the arrival of allied rapid 
deployment forces. (ibid.) Estonia’ independent military defence capability is composed of two 
main parts: Defence Forces and the Estonian Defence League, both of which act under the 
authority of the Ministry of Defence. (ibid.) Defence Forces is an organisation that plans and 
conducts military operations to defend the territory, territorial waters, and airspace of Estonia, 
and consists of professionals and reservists. While professional members of Defence Forces are 
intensively involved in international missions, the conscripts and reservists provide national 
security locally. As compulsory military service for men between 18 and 27 years old remains 
the main source for reserve units and recruitment of professionals of the Defence Forces, the 
motivation of conscripts has become an important foundation of national defence (National 
security concept of Estonia, 2017). Roughly 3,3 thousand people enter the conscription service 
annually, after which they become reservists and can be called for military exercises (Andžāns 
& Veebel, 2017). While all Estonian male citizens must serve in the Defence Forces, many 
conscripts from Ida-Virumma and other regions have Russian backgrounds. Many of them have 
grown up in Russian-language environments and have low levels of proficiency in Estonian 
language when they come to the service. Using this situation, some information sources such as 
26 
 
Baltnews and Sputnik articulate with the statements about unequal and unfair treatment of 
soldiers with Russian background.  Be it true or not, the question about loyalty and contentment 
of Russian-speaking conscripts remain relevant for morality of Defence Forces.  
The Estonian Defence League is a voluntary, militarily organized, armed, national 
defence organization, funded by government which has the task to “enhance the population’s 
will to defend its country and ensure readiness for national defence by planning military defence 
activities, including guerrilla activities and resistance movements, and participating in such 
activities.” (National Defence Strategy, 2011) The Estonian Defence League members during 
wartime shall be deployed as part of the Defence Forces’ structure. The Estonian Defence 
League actively involves young people in the activities of the organization.  While many 
Russian-speakers are members of the Defence League, the organisation has several times been 
accused of nationalism in media. For instance, in 2015 there was a scandal when a specialist of 
public relations of the Defence League, Urmas Reitelmann posted in social media unflattering 
statements about migrants and the Russian-speaking population of Estonia. (Põld, 2015) After 
this event Urmas continued  working in the Defence League. Such things may affect public 
support and trust for the organization among Russian-speakers. 
Since the 1991 EU and NATO integration were the paramount aims of Estonian 
diplomacy and foreign affairs in the field of defence and security. (Kuus, 2002, 304) A major 
reason for this international policy stance was the lack of physical resources to enhance 
Estonia’s own security. (Männik, 2004). The “Russian threat” was one of the main reasons to 
domestically legitimise international integration and overcome public concerns about 
sovereignty questions.  Estonia’s EU and NATO integration were not only economic and 
military projects against the “Russian threat”, but also cultural ones, which declared Estonia’s 
identity as a member of the western community and alienation from Russia’s hegemony. (Kuus, 
2002). Active involvement in NATO and EU remains a priority of Estonia’s security policy to 
this day. International defence cooperation, participation in NATO military operations and 
acceptance of principals of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are also 
essential parts of Estonian defence policy (National security concept of Estonia, 2010). They 
not only give an opportunity for Estonia to participate in the promotion of peace and 
international security in the world, but also ensures allies' support in case of foreign threats to 
Estonia. Estonia’s political weight in NATO and CSDP decision-making processes depends on 
its’ active participation in NATO and CSDP endeavours (National Defence Strategy, 2011). 
Thus, Estonia actively contributes to international operations and strives to meet all 
organisational requirements.  In 2017, Estonia was one of only 6 NATO member states (of 29) 
that contributes 2% of its GDP to support NATO defence. (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 
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2017). In 2017 Estonia shared 3rd place with UK after the US and Greece by defence expenditure 
as a share of GDP. In addition to this, Estonia has been actively participating in the operations 
abroad since 1995 (UNPROFOR - mission in Croatia) and gained its first combat experience in 
Iraq in 2003. Since that time Estonian Defence Forces took part in various operations, including 
UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNTSO (Middle-East), MINUSMA (Mali), EUTM (Mali), EUNAVFOR 
MED (Mediterranean Sea), Resolute Support (Afghanistan), ISAF (Afghanistan), Inherent 
Resolve (Iraq), and KFOR (Kosovo). (Estonian Defence Forces, 2017).  Since Estonia lacks the 
capability to ensure the safety of its own airspace, NATO has conducted air policing since 2004. 
The military airbase in Ämari provides the opportunity to help implement the air policing 
mission from Estonia. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). In Estonia is also located the NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence.  After the NATO agreements at the Warsaw 
Summit 2016, the international armoured battlegroup led by UK and consisting of almost 1,200 
troops, was deployed to Estonia, along with heavy land forces equipment including main battle 
tanks, self-propelled artillery and various armoured vehicles. (Luik & Praks, 2017)  
Thus, Estonia is standing for global order based on international law and respect of 
sovereignty and the territorial integrity of other states. Promotion of international security, 
including strong relations with its allies, and the credibility of NATO’s collective defence 
mechanism, and strengthening of Estonia’s own initial defence capability are the main pillars 
of Estonian defence strategy (2011). The key factor for development of its own defence 
capabilities and further EU and NATO integration remains the “Russian threat”. Thus, public 
support of Estonian membership in NATO and EU and threat perception are very important for 
continuity of the current security and defence policy stance. To examine public opinion towards 
Estonian security and defence policy, the Ministry of Defence twice a year monitors attitudes 
of population via research “Public opinion and national defence” which is discussed in the next 
section. 
2.2 Public opinion towards Estonian security and defence policy 
 
The support of the population is essential in a military conflict for any country, but for 
Estonia this issue is especially relevant, as the cohesion of public opinion in security and defence 
policy is far from ideal, especially in threat perception and support of alliance policy. Since 
2001 twice a year upon the order of the Estonian Ministry of Defence in October a survey is 
conducted to monitor public opinion during which Estonian and Russian-speaking residents 
from the age of 15+ are interviewed on security and defence topics. (MOD, 2018). This research 
compared the opinions of Russian-speaking respondents and with attitudes of native Estonians. 
Generally, public support for Estonian security and defence policy as well as for security and 
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defence institutions is quite high. However, the level of support to Estonian security and defence 
policy, confidence in state institutions, support to Estonian membership in NATO and EU and 
threat perception tends to be different for Estonians and Russian-speakers. Being one of the 
most important factors for Estonian security and defence policy, threat perception and support 
of EU/NATO integration through the years remains different among Estonians and Russian-
speakers.  Generally, Russian-speaking respondents’ relation to the development of national 
defence compared to Estonians is less positive. While the perception of “Russian threat” is an 
important factor that stimulates public support for Estonian security and defence policy (Kuus, 
2002), the opinions of Russian-speakers, who do not consider Russia as a threat, are becoming 
a highly relevant security issue.  
Also different are the attitudes toward Estonian membership in NATO among Estonians 
and Russian-speakers. NATO’s growing role in security co-operation and NATO’s enlargement 
is perceived by the Kremlin as being directed against Russia’s interests (National security 
concept of Estonia, 2010). There is extensive evidence that Russia is promoting these attitudes 
also internationally, trying to influence NATO’s support among the populations of its member 
countries.  In March 2017, 91% of surveyed Estonians were in favour of NATO membership, 
but only 31% of the Russian-speaking respondents thought the same. (Kivirähk, 2017). Figure 
4. shows that the support of membership in NATO among Estonians was quite consistent. 
However, a drastic jump of support was seen in the years 2013/2014 when the events in Ukraine 
started to take place. Since the same period the attitudes among Russian-speakers dropped from 
52% to 31%. This can be partly explained by the differences in threat perception among 
Estonians and Russian-speakers. 
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Figure 4. Proportion of the proponents of joining NATO / membership in NATO; comparison 
of the Estonian-speaking and foreign-speaking population 2002–2017 (% of those certainly and 
rather in favour of the aforementioned; N = all respondents). (Kivirähk, 2017) 
Currently, the difference in support of NATO integration remains very high between 
Estonian and Russian-speakers.  For instance, the deployment of over a thousand NATO troops 
to Estonia as part of the implementation of the 2016 Warsaw Summit decision to establish 
NATO’s forward presence in the Baltic States and Poland was perceived differently among 
Estonian and Russian-speaking populations. While 78% of Estonians found that the NATO 
battlegroup has made Estonia more secure, the majority of Russian-speaking respondents did 
not consider this as a positive change in Estonian security. (Kivirähk, 2017, 7)  
Another core difference in the attitudes of Estonian and Russian-speakers is their threat 
perception and relation to Russia’s international affairs. Even though democracy, the principles 
of the rule of law and welfare in Russia are in the interests of Estonia, Russia’s ambitions of 
restoration of its status as a major global power, and readiness to use military force to achieve 
its goals (National security concept of Estonia, 2017) create a formidable security issue for 
Estonia. After the Ukrainian crisis, Russia’s activities to restore its authority were perceived as 
the main threat to the world’s security by the Estonian population. (Kivirähk, 2015) However, 
for Russian-speakers the threat posed by Russia is not perceived the same as for Estonians. 
Nowadays public opinion survey (ibid.) shows that 39% of Estonians consider Russia’s 
activities in restoring its authority dangerous to peace and security in the world, but only 6% of 
Russian-speakers think the same.  
The greatest difference is in how threatening Russia’s steps to restore its authority in 
neighbouring countries are deemed to be. For Estonians, it occupies the sixth place 
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right after the war in Syria (39% and 41% respectively), while Russian-speaking 
respondents place it as last with 6%. (Kivirähk, 2017, 20) 
On the other hand, Russian-speakers tend to perceive Russia as a credible partner and 
good Estonian-Russian relations as the main guarantee of Estonian security. According to the 
Estonian Ministry of Defence studies (Kivirähk, 2017), 67% of Russian-speakers consider that 
good relations with Russia is the primary security guarantee for Estonia, while only 23% of 
Estonian-speaking respondents think the same.  
Estonia’s national defence capabilities are not less important for its security policy than 
membership in NATO, but even here the attitudes of Estonians and Russian-speakers are not 
the same. Nevertheless, the trust in the Estonian Defence Forces among the population is quite 
high. The statistics show that the Estonian Defence Forces are trusted by 92% of Estonians, and 
by 51% of Russian-speaking respondents. The Defence League is trusted by 87% and 37% 
correspondingly. (ibid.) Kivirähk (2017) finds, that Estonians have more faith in Estonia’s 
independent defence capability, with 62% of Estonians and 42% of Russian-speakers thinking 
that Estonia is defendable until help arrives from the allies in the event of an armed foreign 
attack.  
The studies of the Estonian Ministry of Defence (Kivirähk, 2017) has shown that the 
general attitudes toward Estonian security and defence policy of Estonians is quite different 
from those of Russhophones. This difference is clearly seen in relation to the Russian 
Federation, NATO, Defence Forces and Defence League. This shows that the difference of 
attitudes towards security, defence structures and threat perception may go along with the 
difference in support of developments of security, defence and alliance policy. Whether it is 
caused by propaganda or not, in this environment, national security requires a comprehensive 
defence of the country, including non-military measures. Otherwise in case of armed conflict, a 
significant part of population may not be ready to resist a foreign threat. In today’s situation 
42% of Russian-speaking people consider armed resistance necessary (vs. 55% of Estonians) 
and 27% prefer to leave Estonia in case of armed conflict (vs. 19% of Estonians). (Kivirähk, 
2017) However this data does not take into consideration which state would be the aggressor, 
which could be decisive for the Estonian population, as there is a fundamental difference in 
evaluating the activities of Russia between Estonians and Russian-speakers. (ibid.) 
2.3 Interviews with Russian-speaking youth: research design 
 
From existing academic literature, we know that Russian-speakers perceive Estonian 
security and defence policy differently from Estonian-speakers. The level of their support to 
Estonian defence structures and alliance policy is not the same. However, the reasons for these 
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attitudes are still not well researched. Hypothetically speaking, in a situation where Russia is 
perceived as the main threat, and Estonian security and defence policy mainly as a counteraction 
to this threat, the reasons for less positive attitudes of Russian-speakers may be due to their 
social and cultural affinity between Estonia and Russia.  This thesis examines how the self-
identity, social and cultural affinity of Russian-speaking youth in Estonia influence their views 
on Estonian security and defence policy. The examination of the personal reasons for their 
attitudes to the main aspect of Estonian security and defence policy and their correlation with 
affinity to Russia and Estonia will give an additional dimension to the previous findings in this 
field, revealing the factors that determine the formation of certain attitudes. 
So far, the attitudes of the Estonian population towards national security and defence 
policy has been examined only quantitively with a large number of respondents. 
Notwithstanding the wide range of collected information and representative sample, the “Public 
opinion and national defence” is missing an explanation of the core reasons, why the attitudes 
of Russian-speakers towards Estonian security and defence policy tend to be less positive than 
that of native Estonians’. Giving their answers respondents did not explain why they think one 
way or another. It also does not address young Russian-speaking people specifically. The core 
disadvantage of a quantitative analytic strategy is its inability of addressing "how" and "why" 
questions. On the contrary, a qualitative method gives a chance to find explanations for a set of 
events or conditions. (Maxwell, 2008) By using a qualitative method, this thesis examines the 
missing parts in the analysis of public opinion and national defence in Estonia. Namely, it 
examines the reasons why Russian-speakers are loyal or not towards the Estonian defence 
concept, why they trust or do not trust security institutions and why they believe or do not 
believe in potential threats. 
2.3.1 Data gathering method 
The data gathering method used for this research was a semi-structured interview. The 
reason for choosing interview as the primary data gathering method is due to the interest of the 
current research on understanding personal subjective attitudes. As Englander (2012, 13) 
explained, “phenomenological researchers are interested in the subjectivity of other persons and 
thus it seems logical that we would want to get a description of such subjectivity”. Using 
interviews as the data gathering method, I aimed not only to monitor the opinions of the target 
group, but also to see how they explain the reasons of one or another opinion. This research has 
no representative sample as it does not use a statistically-based approach. Freud, Piaget, and 
Skinner developed their theories and made foundational findings without dependence upon 
statistical analysis, conducting their research with small numbers of subjects. (ibid.) According 
to Englander (2012), when research has a qualitative purpose (to examine attitudes towards 
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Estonian security and defence policy among the Russian-speaking youth in Estonia and their 
reasons) and research question (how the closeness to Estonia and Russia determine attitudinal 
integration of Russian-speaking youth in Estonia in the field of defence and security), the 
research seeks knowledge of the content of the experience (the meaning of the phenomenon of 
transnationalism in Estonian settings). Thus, the semi-structured interview method seemed to 
be the most appropriate to the aim of current research.   
Most of the questions posed in these semi-structured interviews followed the structure 
of how and why (see Appendix 2.). The initial questions asked for general information and 
additional questions asked for clarifications. Thus, the structure of the interview may be partly 
spontaneous in between these questions. The structure follows the responses of the interviewee, 
which enables the semi-structured interview to get the information necessary for explanations 
of the particular phenomenon. (ibid.)2 
The interview data gathering procedure can be divide into two general methods, first is 
the traditional face-to-face interview, and second is written (or recorded) (Giorgi, 2009). Even 
though the traditional way is more time-consuming and difficult, it is usually richer in terms of 
nuances and depth (Englander, 2012). In this research the traditional face-to-face interview 
method was used. All interviews were recorded on a dictaphone and then transcribed manually. 
Interviews were conducted mostly in public places, such as cafes and university buildings, but 
also several times at the respondents’ homes. The face-to-face approach also gave a significant 
advantage to the current research in that I had a chance to monitor the way that respondents 
answered the questions. The linguistic manner of expressions gives additional information and 
sometimes even becomes essential to understand the attitude of the respondent on a particular 
issue. For example, asking about the threat perception there could be significant difference in 
the answers: “Russia is a threat to our security” and “Russia is perceived as a threat here”, or 
“NATO presence is good for their (Estonians’) security feeling” and “NATO forces in Estonia 
make us feel more secure”.  
Each interview took on average one hour and covered the respondent’s social 
background, national self-identification, language proficiency and preferences, cultural features 
and national preferences. It also addressed attitudes towards Estonian military institutions the 
Estonian defence concept, Estonian military alliances, threats perception and readiness to 
participate in national defence. The structure of the interview began with simple and neutral 
questions (such as, what your age is, what city are you from) and by the end reached more 
                                                                
2 For instance, after the reply to the question if the respondent had engaged in military service, the following 
questions could vary accordingly to the response. If they had served, then the next question could be why: by his 
own will or he had no option. If the person did not serve, then the next question could be, why: was it due to some 
health reasons and would the person want to otherwise serve. 
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specific and sensitive questions (such as, are you ready in case of military conflict to defend 
Estonia or what are you going to do, if there will be military conflict with Russia). This and 
many other useful hints were taken from the MOOC “Qualitative Research Methods” taught by 
Dr Gerben Moerman (2018) of the University of Amsterdam. 
2.3.2 Sampling method 
The interviews were conducted in different regions, which gave an opportunity to see 
the broader picture of the situation in all Estonia. The research covered opinions of respondents 
from Tallinn, Tartu, Pärnu, Loksa, Narva, Kohtla-Järve, Jõhvi, Sillamäe and what is especially 
interesting Tapa, where is located the largest contingent of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence 
in Estonia.  Because of the somewhat sensitive nature of the study topic, participation in the 
interviews was voluntary and anonymous (See Appendix.1), with 25 persons in total being 
interviewed. As the interviews are not a representative sample, it is not possible to generalize 
the results to the entire population. Nevertheless, it provides solid information about the target 
group which consists of Russian-speaking residents of Estonia aged 17-31 who permanently 
live in Estonia, especially in regions with large Russian-speaking communities. Respondents 
were recruited using the purposeful sampling technique, which is the most common approach 
used in qualitative studies. (Marshall, 1996, 523) This technique involves “developing a 
framework of the variables that might influence an individual's contribution” (ibid.) and based 
on the “researcher's practical knowledge of the research area, the available literature and 
evidence from the study itself.” (ibid.) The aim was to reach maximum variation of the sample, 
represented by respondents of different genders, education levels, citizenship, age, occupation, 
origin and nationality. 
Here is a short description of the sample. From 25 respondents 13 had a higher 
education, 14 upper secondary education, and 3 basic comprehensive education. 13 were males 
and 12 females. The sample covered people with different occupations including 5 students, 5 
working students, 14 working people and 1 unemployed. To depict possible differences between 
different regions, respondents from various cities were selected. 4 respondents weere from 
Tallinn, 2 from Tartu, 2 from Pärnu, 1 from Loksa, 3 from Narva ,9 from Kohtla-Järve, 2 from 
Jõhvi, 1 from Sillamäe and 1 from Tapa. For one, who is not familiar with Estonian segregation 
of population the geographical aspect in terms of relatively small Estonian territory may seem 
not relevant. However, in Estonia there are cities mainly populated by Estonian-speakers and 
cities mainly populated by Russian-speakers, such as Sillamäe, Kohtla-Järve and Narva.  For 
this research it is interesting how the linguistic and social environment influences the attitudes 
of respondents. In addition to this, the study involves a critical case sample, with subjects who 
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have specific experiences (Marshall, 1996, 523), as military service or rejection to be 
conscripted.  
One of the main advantages of this study is that it includes not only opinions, but also 
information about social background, language skills and self-identification of respondents. 
This offers the opportunity to compare (trans)national characteristics of respondents such as 
national identity and language skills with attitudinal integration in the field of defence and 
security. The interviews were conducted in Russian language with transliteration and 
transcription into English.  
2.3.3 Method of analysis 
 
In this research, the attitudes of Russian-speaking youth are correlated with their 
integration to Estonian society and affinity towards the Estonian state and the level of their 
transnational ties with Russia. This methodology is based on the triadic nexus model by Rogers 
Brubaker (1996) which places the attitudes of young representatives of the Russian-speaking 
community between their host state (Estonia) and kin state (Russia). The affinity of respondents 
with Estonia or Russia is the independent variable (IV) of the research. It is conceptualised as a 
level of transnationalism between integration to Estonian society including cultural, social and 
economic belongingness and affinity with Russia. For operationalization various factors are 
considered such as: “citizenship”, “language proficiency and daily practice”, “desired place of 
life”, “vision on future for kids”, “level of trust towards native Estonians or Russian-speakers”, 
“level of familiarity and the importance of Russian/Estonian culture”, “national self-identity”. 
The answers that reflect affinity towards the Estonian nation and state are given a positive value, 
whereas the answers that reflect affinity for Russia are given a negative value, while neutral 
answers are giving zero. Here are some examples of the questions used for the 
operationalization of the IV. 
• Have you studied in a Russian- or Estonian-language school? 
• How well do you speak the Estonian language, how much do you use it in daily life 
(communicating with friends, colleagues, fellow-students), in what language do you 
prefer to watch or read news/movies/books? 
• How much do you communicate at your work/school with Estonians  and how much 
with Russian-speakers? Can you roughly estimate the percentage? How much do you 
communicate in your private live with Estonian vs. Russian-speakers? Can you roughly 
estimate in percentage? Whom would you prefer as a friend/colleague/fellow-students: 
native Estonians/Russians, Russian-speaking Estonians, or other? Whom do you trust 
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more? How important would you consider knowledge of Estonian language for you 
children? What language of education would you prefer for your children?  
• What is your current citizenship, what does it mean for you and what are the reasons 
for having this? 
• What country do you prefer to live, study and work in? Why? How big probability is it 
that you will stay and work in Estonia? How big probability is it that you will search 
for studying or working opportunities in Russia?  
• What occasions do you usually celebrate, Estonian Independence Day, Christmas 
(Orthodox Christmas), Victory day (9 May). What does this occasion mean for you? 
Have you ever participated in the Estonian Song Festival (in Estonian: laulupidu), 
Victory day celebration (Immortal Regiment)? Do you like Estonian/Russian music, 
art, literature, movies? Which do you prefer? 
• How would you identify yourself in general (Estonian/Russian/Russian-speaking 
Estonian) What does it mean to be Estonian/Russian/Russian-speaking Estonian? How 
would you identify yourself being abroad? Speaking with native Estonian? Being in 
Russia? 
Every answer was analysed individually, accordingly to the importance of one or another 
factor for the respondents. For the general evaluation an affinity index is used where: 1 point is 
given for answers with pro-Estonian connotation, - 1 point for pro-Russian and 0 for neutral.  
After the evaluation, the respondents were divided into three major categories: closer to Estonia 
(affinity index from 1 to 0.25), neutral (affinity index from -0.25 to +0.25) and closer to Russia 
(affinity index -0.25 to -1). 
The dependent variable (DV) is represented by the attitudinal integration of the 
respondents in the field of security and defence policy. The DV (attitudinal integration) is 
conceptualized by the convergence of opinions of Russian-speakers with the Estonian defence 
strategy and security concept and the average opinion of native Estonians taken from the Public 
Opinion and National Defence (Kivirähk, 2017) research, which was ordered by the Estonian 
Ministry of Defence. The personal opinions and attitudes of respondents were evaluated, by the 
questions in which respondent had to indicate whether one is agreeing or not with proposed 
claims, or trust or do not trust given institutions. Many questions were taken from the Public 
Opinion and National Defence survey (ibid.) to make the answers comparable with the average 
opinion of Estonian-speakers, the overview of which was given in subchapter 2.1.
 Overview of Estonian security and defence policy. 
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For the general evaluation an attitudinal index was used where: 1 point was given for 
answers with positive connotation, - 1 point for negative 0 for neutral.  After the evaluation, the 
respondents were divided into three major categories: negative (average attitudinal index 
ranging from -1 to -0.25), neutral (average attitudinal index ranging from -0.25 to +0.25) and 
positive (average attitudinal index ranging from +0.25 to +1). The respondents were also asked 
to explain their opinion to find the reasons for their attitudes and indicate the level of correlation 
with the IV.  
Here are some examples of the questions that were used for the operationalization of the DV: 
 
• What image does the Estonian Defence Forces have for you, positive, negative or 
neutral? Why? Do you trust the Estonian Defence Forces? Do you consider them 
necessary?  
• What image does the Estonian Defence League have for you, positive, negative or 
neutral? Why? Do you trust the Defence League? Do you consider it necessary?  
• What image does NATO have for you, positive, negative or neutral? Why? Do you 
consider Estonian membership in NATO necessary? NATO member states agreed at the 
2016 Warsaw summit to forward deploy multinational battalion battle groups to some 
NATO members, including Estonia. Since that time about 1300 NATO troops were 
deployed to Estonia. How do you feel about that? Do you support the presence of NATO 
troops in Estonia? Why? Whom do you consider as a NATO soldier? (Soldier from 
another country/Estonian soldier). Do you think that membership in NATO guarantees 
security for Estonia? Why? Do you consider NATO as a threat to Russia? 
• What do you think about military service in the Estonian Defence Forces, is it 
prestigious? Why? Have you been/would you like to go to army? Why? Do you consider 
obligatory conscription necessary in Estonia (for men/women)? 
• If Estonia would be attacked by any country, do you consider armed resistance 
necessary? Would you be ready to personally protect Estonia in case of an armed 
conflict? In case of conflict with Russia?  
• What do you consider as a main threat to Estonian security?  
2.4 Interviews with Russian-speaking youth: results 
2.4.1. Main findings 
Here are listed some statistical observations that give an overview of the general 
dispersion of the answers. The summary of answers is visualized in Figure 5, where on the 
horizontal axis 1 is absolute affinity with Estonia and – 1 is absolute affinity with Russia, and 
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on vertical axis 1 is an absolutely positive attitude to Estonian security and defence policy and 
– 1 absolutely negative attitude. The dotted line reflects the trend. 
 
Figure 5. Location of respondents in terms of affinity to either Estonia or Russia and attitudinal 
integration. 
• Most of the respondents showed slightly higher affinity to Russia, Russian language and 
culture than to Estonia. The average affinity index was -0,09 where 1 is complete affinity 
to Estonia and -1 is full affinity to Russia. 7 respondents identified themselves rather 
with Estonia, 1 in between and 17 rather with Russia. However, the index is so close to 
0 that it shows that generally respondents did not identify themselves either with kin 
state or with host state. Rather, their self-identity stays somewhere in the middle between 
Russia and Estonia.    
• The general attitude towards Estonian security and defence policy was rather positive. 
The average attitude index was 0,2 where 1 is totally positive attitude and -1 is totally 
negative. 
• Generally speaking, the statistical trend shows that the more a respondent self-identifies 
with Russia, the less positive is their attitude towards Estonian security and defence 
policy. Nevertheless, 9 respondents out of 17 indicated a higher level of affinity with 
Russia but with a rather positive attitude towards Estonians security and defence policy. 
-1
-0,8
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
-1 -0,8 -0,6 -0,4 -0,2 0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1
A
tt
it
u
d
in
al
 in
d
ex
Affinity index 
38 
 
Only 2 respondents out of 7, who identify themselves more with Estonia, expressed a 
rather negative attitude towards Estonian security and defence policy. This may lead us 
to conclude that affinity with Russia does not automatically mean a negative attitude 
towards Estonian security and defence policy, but the affinity with Estonia in most cases 
is linked with a positive attitude towards Estonian security and defence policy.  
• People with higher education tend to identify themselves less with Russia than 
respondents with lower levels of education. Their average affinity index is -0,07 while 
for others it is -0,1. Respondents with higher education showed a more positive attitude 
towards Estonian security and defence policy, with an average attitudinal index of 0,3, 
while others scored 0,1 on the same scale.  
• Respondents from the Ida-Virumaa (region with the highest amount of the Russian-
speaking population) showed less affinity to Estonia, with an average index of -0,13 
than people from other regions with an average index -0,03. At the same time, people 
from Ida-Virumaa had a slightly less positive attitude towards Estonian security and 
defence policy (verage index of 0,19) than people from other regions (average index 
0,22). 
• The affinity to Estonia was higher among male respondents, with average index 0,01 
compared to female average index -0,21. Male respondents also showed a slightly more 
positive relation to Estonian security and defence policy (index 0,21) than female 
respondents (index 0,19).  
• Notwithstanding the fact, that they have served in the Defence Forces, respondents who 
have been conscripted showed less affinity to Estonia, with an average index of -0,22, 
compared to other respondents (-0,05), and their attitude towards Estonian security and 
defence policy was less positive (0,1) than others’ (0,23). 
• Respondents with Estonian citizenship have higher affinity to Estonia (average index -
0,26) compared to respondents with Russian citizenship or without citizenship (-0,59). 
Estonian citizens also relate better to Estonian security and defence policy, with average 
index 0,21 than others (0,13). 
• Over 90% of the respondents do not consider an Estonian solider as a soldier of NATO. 
For most of them a NATO soldier is something “more serious” unusually connected 
with the US army. 
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2.4.2 Categorical analysis  
2.4.2.1 Category – closer to Russia 
The first category of respondents are the ones who feel the least affinity to the Estonian 
state and culture and find more connections with Russia, Russian language and culture. Their 
affinity index ranges from -1 to -0.25 (where 1 is complete affinity to Estonia and -1 is full 
affinity to Russia). This is the largest group of respondents, 12 out of 25, which comprises 48% 
of the interviewees.  This group is mainly represented by people who identify themselves as 
Russians or Estonian Russians. Here it is important to note the difference between Russian 
Estonians and Estonian Russians. In translation from Russian language, where the first is 
Русский Эстонец and second is Эстонский Русский, the first underlines that the person is 
Estonian, but Russian Estonian and the second emphasizes that the person is still Russian, but 
“local” Estonian Russian.  
The main reason for these people to consider themselves Russians is due to their origins. 
Respondents whose identity is based on Russian origins can be divided into two groups. First 
are those that were born in Russia, with explanations that were usually quite straightforward and 
irrefutable, such as: “I was born in the USSR, what factually means that I was born in Russia.”, 
“I was born in Russia, and I do not think that I have something to hide or to be ashamed of.”, or 
just “I was born in Russia.”. An interesting observation is that the person who was born in Russia 
feels a stronger moral right to call themselves Russian. The respondent born is Pskov explained: 
“Here in Estonia it feels different between Russians and Estonians, but if you are really from 
Russia, then you feel some pride. Estonians start to respect you, when they realize that you are 
actually from Russia and can speak Estonian.” Indeed, respondents born in Russia were much 
more self-assured answering questions about national self-identity. During the interviews, some 
respondents born in Estonia expressed obvious confusion being asked about national identity, 
as they are mostly considered in Estonia as Russians, but actually many of them have never been 
to Russia.  
The second group of the respondents with strong Russian national identity based on 
origins say that they consider it this way because they were born in a Russian family and they 
have Russian roots. Most of the people from this category are from or are living in cities mainly 
populated by Russian-speakers, such as Narva, Sillamäe, Loksa or Kohtla-Järve. Answering the 
question, if your self-identity ever changed, the respondent from Loksa said:  
Before Gymnasium (Upper-secondary school) I felt that I was 100% Russian. It was 
because, I lived in a totally Russian environment, I was studying in a Russian school 
and Russian music school. Estonian language I only heard in school during Estonian 
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language classes, I just knew that we had to know it. Estonian language and Estonians 
were part of another world for me. I still feel myself Russian. About nationality I thought 
for the first time in 11th grade and this thinking changed something in me, then I 
understood how it works. 
This category of respondent would consider themselves Russians with native Estonians 
or being abroad, but not always in Russia. Being in Russia some of them, especially ones, who 
born in Estonia feel the difference between Russian Russians and Estonian Russians. In Russia 
some respondents tend to slightly change their national self-identity from Estonian Russians to 
Russian Estonians.  
All respondents with Russian citizenship or without citizenship belong to this category. 
They have permanent residence permit, which allows them to live, study and work in Estonia, 
and travel both to Schengen area and Russia. They have distinct reasons for being Russia’s 
citizens or aliens, but generally they feel quite comfortable not obtaining Estonian citizenship. 
Respondent with Russian citizenship explains it this way: 
It happened, that my parents could not get Estonian citizenship, because my father was 
working in Soviet Army, so I also could not get it. But this issue actually never bothered 
me, because with permanent residence permit I can travel in Europe and Russia. My 
passport does not have any meaning for me, just a paper. If I could choose, I would 
choose Estonian passport. I can get it at any point, but I have not done it yet. With 
Estonian passport it would be better to work abroad, as far as I do not have such plans, 
I do not need Estonian citizenship.   
Respondent without citizenship says next: “I decided not to change it, because my 
grandmother lives in Russia and I would need to make visa to visit her. I do not participate in 
elections, so I do not see how Estonian passport can be useful for me.” Most of the respondents 
of this category with Estonian citizenship see more practical advantages in being Estonian 
citizens, than any national and patriotic feelings. “I am a citizen of Europe”, answers the question 
“what means Estonian citizenship for you” respondent from Kohtla-Järve.  
Almost all respondents from this category have been studying in Russian schools. About 
half of them do not speak Estonian or can hardly speak. They rarely use Estonian language in 
daily life, they have mostly Russian friends and usually work also in Russian language. The only 
place, where they encounter with Estonians is usually place of studies, because the higher 
education is mostly in Estonian. They read books and watch movies, only in Russian language, 
if not Russian then they would prefer English to Estonian. Nevertheless, some of them prefer to 
read news in Estonian, because they think that information can be different. Explaining why 
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they do not communicate with Estonians, most of the respondents did not express any negative 
thinking towards Estonians or Estonian language, rather just the life circumstances alienated 
them from Estonians. Respondent from Kohtla-Järve explains: “I lived in Russian-speaking 
region, my social circle was Russian, the level of Estonian was low and there was no necessity 
to learn it. There was no need to make Estonian friends. I know some Estonians only from work 
or sport.” 
This category of respondents usually finds it’s more comfortable to work or study with 
Russian-speakers. They trust Russian-speakers more than Estonians. “I would rather trust 
Russians, Estonians are a bit from another planet.”, says female respondent from Kohtla-Järve.  
Speaking about plans on future, all respondents want they children to know Estonian 
language, if they will live in Estonia. Some respondents hope that their children will know 
Estonian better than their parents and be more integrated to Estonian society. Respondents think 
that it will increase the position of their children on the labour market and make them more 
competitive. Nevertheless, only half of the people from this category would send their children 
to Estonian schools. They consider that Russian language is also important, and they are afraid 
that in Estonian school the performance will decrease due to learning not in mother tongue.  
Russian cultural aspects are rather important for this group of respondents. They are 
more familiar with Russian literature, music and cinematography. Most of them find Russian 
art closer and easier to understand than Estonian. “Purely emotionally Russian culture is closer, 
may be if I would know Estonian, I would be more interested in Estonian culture.”, explains 
female respondent from Kohtla-Järve. Few of respondents have ever celebrated or participated 
in celebration of Estonian Independence Day or Estonian Song Festivals, if they did, they rather 
have been to the event with school or music school. None of them have participated 
independently, being adult. However, they consider very important celebrations such as New 
Year Eve, 23 February (Defender of the Fatherland Day, a holiday celebrated in Russia and 
other Post-Soviet states, which is sometimes observed as men's day. The origins of this day are 
coming from Russian Civil War and creation of the Red Army), 8 March (Women’s day). 
Especially important date for most of them is 9 May (The Victory Day in the Great Patriotic 
War II.) “I congratulated veterans, they deserve it. We must give them honour, because they did 
a lot in Russia and Estonia.”, “Even if I am alone, I find time to bring flowers. For me it is 
important to commemorate those, who fought to let us live in peace.” this is how they interpret 
this day. Most of the respondents from this group have participated in laying on of flowers or 
“immortal regiment” walk. For many of them it became a family event, when they 
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commemorate own fallen relatives and watch Russia’s military parade on TV. All these dates 
usually are not celebrated by Estonians, those are quite “Russian” events.  
Nevertheless, keeping these transnational linguistic, cultural and social ties, most of the 
respondents do not want to move anywhere from Estonia. They consider Estonia as their home 
and do not want to live in Russia. “There is a lot of criminal in Russia, at us in Estonia it is 
peaceful and good.”, says a respondent from Sillamäe. I intentionally left the structure “at us in 
Estonia” (У нас в Эстонии) in direct English translation, because it demonstrates a clear 
narrative of considering Estonia as something “our”, opposed to Russia which does not fit to the 
same label.  Respondents often underline the difference in order and rule of law between Estonia 
and Russia. “I am working as a bank clerk, and sometimes clients from Russia are offering 
bribes for me to open bank accounts. For us it is unacceptable, for them it is normality, one who 
has money is always right there.  Our country is much better for people than Russia.”  
The general attitude of this category to Estonian security and defence policy is less 
positive than the average of the focus group. Corresponding average attitudinal indexes are 0,02 
and 0,2. Mostly they showed apathy to Estonian security and defence policy due to the lack of 
knowledge and interest. They do not consider Russia as a threat and do not understand why 
Estonia should invest so much money to security and defence. 
Their attitude to Estonian Defence Forces is mostly neutral. Most of the respondents just 
know so little about the topic, that it is hard to express any certain attitude.  They just feel 
illogical to maintain own Defence Forces, if there is no threat.  “For inner security army is not 
needed, we have police and special forces. Another thing is if some other country will attack us, 
but who could it be? For what?”, says respondent from Kohtla-Järve. Some respondents express 
their complaints about the costs for the budget and conscription policy.  
I would rather relate neutrally, as far as it does not touch me. But I do not like that in 
such little country we spend so much for Defence Forces. Another negative point is the 
military exercises. Being conscripted once, you can be called for military exercises any 
day. They send you invitation couple of days before the exercise and if you will not show 
up, you will be fined for 1200 EUR. This is too much. On the one hand you are free 
person, on the other you never know when you will be pulled to army, and all your plans 
may be spoiled one day. 
Half of the respondents from this category to do not trust Defence Forces and there are 
two reasons for this, negative personal experience or disbelieve in the capability of Defence 
Forces. “I met people who have done their military service, their inappropriate behaviour speaks 
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about their inability to protect anyone. They have been there, done that and they do not care 
anymore.”, says respondent from Tartu.  
Saturday, weekend at 5 am I wake up because of shooting outside. At that time, we were 
intimidated that WWIII may start soon. I look outside and see that soldiers are running 
on the streets, shooting and covering behind our playground. I was so frightened, I did 
not understand what it was. Later I was angry that nobody informed us about the 
exercises. 
Speaks about her experience respondent from Loksa. Respondent from Narva said: “I 
would trust defence forces, in face or terroristic threat. But they are mainly aimed for deterrence 
of Russia. I believe that they do their best in terms of the state capacity, but it will never be 
enough to deter their potential enemy.”. Once again respondent shows disagreement with 
positioning Russia as an enemy, saying “their potential enemy”. Answering the question, if 
Defence Forces protect your own security respondents answer: “From whom they secure me?”, 
“I defend myself”, “Maybe in terms of inner security”. They are not sure, if Defence Forces can 
and will defend them. Generally, they do not mind that Estonia would have own army, but they 
would like to see it rather as professional army, referring to the fact that we have allies that 
should “allegedly” protect us. Respondents find that doing military service is prestigious. 
However, they think that it is prestigious because the guys “overcome difficulties far from 
home” and “harden men’s character”, not because they protect someone or something. This 
supports the widely spread narrative among Russian-speakers, that every man should serve in 
army, in this case it does not matter in which army they serve. Nevertheless, most of the 
respondents from the category think that the conscription should be voluntary. “I do not like, 
that people are forced to give an oath to be ready to die for the country. It is obligatory, you have 
no own will or option. You just must be ready to die for the country and I do not understand 
why.” 
Their attitude to Estonian Defence league is more positive than to Defence Forces, 
mainly it is reasoned by the voluntary character of this organization. They think that it could be 
great solution for education and upbringing youth: “They made quite positive impression on me. 
I have seen them on a city fair, when they showed military equipment to kids and friendly 
answered their questions.”, says respondent from Pärnu. However, in terms of military 
protection they still do not feel much trust to this organization. Firstly, because they do not find 
Defence League professional enough: “To be honest, they are just war play lovers. Serving in 
army I have encountered them, and I would not say that they are professionals.” says respondent 
from Tallinn. Another reason for this mistrust cores in nationalistic fame of the organization. “If 
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the war will erupt they will not protect any Russian-speaker. If you are Estonian then yes, but if 
you are Russian, for you it is over.”, says respondent from Sillamäe.   
To the idea of the organisation I relate positively. People can learn how to protect the 
fatherland or just can develop own personal skills. Generally, I relate positively to 
Defence League. To be honest, I do not like, how the organisation treats Russian-
speakers in Estonia, even though there are many Russian members of Defence League. 
For instance, some time ago public relations specialist of Defence League publicly 
criticising migration policy, stated that in Estonia live 300000 parasites, obviously 
meaning Russian-speakers, because the number of Russian-speakers quite corresponds 
to it. Even if some of them are not citizens, they live here, they pay taxes on which 
Defence League is existing. Estonia gives them residence permit, those there should be 
a reason for it and they have right for equal relation to them and protection on the same 
level as other Estonian residents. Following reaction of government defended 
immigrants, but nobody from the government or Defence League stood up on the side 
of 300000 offended Russian-speakers.  
Such behaviour of representatives of public institutions may quite drastically influence 
the attitudes of people to all defence sector in general. “Obviously, if representative of military 
institution calls you parasite, you will have doubts that this organization will protect you the 
same way as others.”, summarizes respondent from Kohtla-Järve. 
Much more negatively this category of respondents relates to NATO. If Defence Forces 
and Defence League are considered by the respondents as necessary organisations, that should 
be in every country, then attitude to NATO is rather ambiguous. More than half of the 
respondents expressed negative attitude to NATO, explaining that mainly by discontent with 
joint military operations in Syria, Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan. Respondent from Tartu explains 
his position: 
I think rather negatively about NATO. I understand that Estonia became a part of NATO 
because of its’ fear of Russia. If Estonia would not be NATO and EU member it would 
be totally failed state. In this sense NATO provides stability to Estonia. Nevertheless, I 
think that NATO is fully controlled by US and works in its’ interests. I do not support 
NATO because of its connection with operations in Syria, Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Even thought, the relation is slightly negative, most of the respondents from this category 
still support Estonian membership in NATO, because it gives at least some hope in case of 
military conflict. However, they doubt in NATO’s will and capacity to protect Estonia. “NATO 
is not a guarantee of Estonia’s security. If Russia attack, they will be first to run away from here. 
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What can they oppose to Russia’s divisions, several hundreds of soldiers with machineguns and 
transport that may even fail to reach the border?”, says respondent from Kohtla-Järve, who has 
been conscribed as a truck driver for 11 months.    
Especially critically this category of respondents comments the expansion of enhanced 
forward presence of NATO in Estonia. In most of the answers appear phrases as: “Provocation”, 
“We do not need them”, “What do they prepare for?”. They think that NATO regional presence 
is not powerful enough to deter Russia, but it can provoke the conflict by expansion near 
Russia’s borders. One of the most irrefragable answers was given by the respondent from Tartu:  
After the events in Ukraine and Georgia NATO decided that it is essential to deploy 
additional forces on the NATO borders in Baltic States and Poland. They call it an 
answer to expansion of Russia’s military forces on western borders. However, they do 
not understand that this may bring an opposite effect, because Russia is also threatened 
by expansion of NATO forces near to its’ borders and will response the same way. We 
need to stop this, or it will only escalate the situation.   
Finally, very interesting answers were given by this category of respondents on the 
question about hypothetical armed conflict. Mostly they think, that in case of armed conflict 
with bigger state Estonia does not have much chances to protect itself, it will be possible only 
in case of support from allies. The decision to fight or not to fight for Estonia depends on the 
reasons of conflict. Most of the respondents from this group consider Estonia as their home, and 
if someone will pose threat to their home or relatives, most of them will be ready to participate 
in defence according to their abilities. Interesting to notice, that they do not care from whom to 
protect their homes. As said respondent from Kohtla-Järve: “If Russians will attack we will fight 
with Russians, if Americans then we should fight Americans.” Anyway, the armed conflict with 
Russia is highly undesired by this group of people, because they will become the most 
vulnerable objects in this battle. “I live in Estonia, but I am Russian citizen. I always thought if 
it happens will I be deported from Estonia, or from Russia as well.”  doubts respondent from 
Pärnu. Even if they would like to defend Estonia, they are afraid to be unwelcome by titular 
nation in case of armed conflict with Russia. Those, all of them would stand for peaceful conflict 
resolutions.  
All things considered, the category of respondents, who feel more affinity to Russia than 
to Estonia did not show great support to Estonian security and defence policy, but they neither 
were the most critical to it. If we divide all focus group accordingly to their attitudes also in 
three categories, where the most negative group has average attitudinal index ranging from -1 
to -0.25, neutral has average attitudinal index ranging from -0.25 to +0.25 and the most positive 
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group has average attitudinal index ranging from +0.25 to +1, then only 3 respondents out of 12 
will fall under category “the most negative”. This is partly explained by their vulnerability. 
Having the most social ties with Russia, they afraid the most any military conflict, that is why 
they are seeking for protection by Defence Forces, Defence League and NATO, that may 
become decisive factor in restraining armed conflict. At the same time, they do not believe that 
these institutions will protect them in case of armed conflict. Even thought, they are living in 
transnational cultural space and maintain transnational social ties, all of them consider Estonia 
as their home and only few of them would like to live in Russia. On the other hand, they neither 
fall under the category “the most positive” in relation to Estonian security and defence policy. 
Only two respondents from the category who feel more affinity to Russia than to Estonia have 
attitudinal index higher than 0.25. Being the least socially integrated they often feel the lack of 
acceptance and protection from national defence institutions. Some radical statements done by 
politicians and public servants make them feel unwelcome and those unsecured. In addition to 
this, being the most vulnerable they afraid the most any kind of provocation. Those, they rather 
support Estonian Defence Forces, Defence League and membership in NATO, but they are 
critically against of any kind of military expansion policy.  
2.4.2.2 Category – in the middle 
The second category of respondents are the ones, whose cultural and social affinity does 
not clearly belong neither to Estonia nor to Russia. Their affinity index is ranging from -0.25 to 
0.25. Where 1 is complete affinity to Estonia and -1 is full affinity to Russia. This is the second 
biggest group of the respondents, 7 persons out of 25, what makes 28% of the focus group.  This 
group is mainly represented by people whose self-identity is neither Estonian nor Russian and 
often varies accordingly to the situation. Some of them consider themselves Russian-speaking 
Estonians, what underlines that they are rather Estonians, but those who speak Russian as mother 
tongue. Other preferer to avoid showing affinity to Estonia or Russia. Basing on at least part of 
their roots or territorial origin of their family they choose neutral national identities such as 
Tatars, Poles, Ukrainians or Lithuanians. However, none of them speak language of their 
claimed nationality, but use Russian as their mother tongue. The self-identity of this category of 
respondents tends to change in different settings. While in Estonia they tend to avoid questions 
about nationality or choose neutral identity, then in Russia or speaking with foreigners most of 
them would tell that they are Estonians or at least from Estonia not specifying nationality. This 
may be explained by the fact that for Estonians or Russians it may be obvious that they are not 
Estonians, those they cannot pretend in this situation. 
This category of respondents finds it hard to answer to identity questions. They feel 
significant difference between Russians and Russian-speaking Estonians. Being born in Estonia, 
47 
 
they are more adopted to Estonian mentality, but cannot confidently claim that they are 
Estonians, because of the lack of proficiency in Estonian language, Russian accent or difference 
from Estonians caused by childhood in Russian family and Russian language/cultural space. “I 
was raised in Russian, Soviet cultural traditions. I have Russian family, but my mentality is more 
adopted to Estonia.”, explains 28 years old respondent from Kohtla-Järve. The age here also 
plays role, because younger respondents usually do not mention any influence of Soviet legacy 
on their social and cultural identity. Even though, some respondents would prefer to call 
themselves Estonians, Russian cultural and linguistic circumstances where they grow up differ 
them from Estonians. The respondent from Kohtla-Järve, living in Tallinn, who does not speak 
Estonian, on the questions about nationality always answers, “I am Estonian”. In the same time, 
she admits: 
Actually, I am a person without nationality, as most of local Russian-speakers of our 
generation. We are from Russian families, born in Estonia. There is a lot of such a lost 
people like me. … When you reflect, it becomes obvious that we are not Estonians at all. 
Everything depends on culture that you were raised in. Even though, we born here, have 
Estonian citizenship and love our country, the national self-identity is complicated. 
This category of respondents can be divided into two groups. The first who has never 
considered themselves Russians due to their origins – “I have never though that I am Russian, I 
only speak Russian. My parents are from Lithuania and raised me in Lithuanian traditions.”, 
“My ancestors have different nationalities Belarusians, Ukrainians, Poles, that is why I do not 
think that I am Russian.”; the second whose self-identity changed after meeting with Russians 
from Russia – “I thought that I am Russian, even was Russia’s patriot, until we went with my 
family for vocation to Greece, where we met other Russians. They behaved totally differently, 
aggressively.”, “Living in Kohtla-Järve, with only indirect contact with Estonians, I thought that 
I am Russian. This changed when for the first time I travelled to Russia, I realized that we have 
different values. Now I do not relate myself to Russians more than to Estonians.”, clarify 
respondents with affinity in the middle between Estonia and Russia.  
All the respondents from this category are Estonian citizens. Most of them born with 
Estonian citizenship, some received citizenship after naturalization of their parents. The attitude 
towards citizenship for them is rather pragmatic. They find, that this is a good opportunity to 
travel and participate in European youth projects. Nevertheless, some of them express national 
proud of being Estonian citizen or denote certain level of contentment holding Estonian 
passport.  “I do not have any special reasons for having Estonian citizenship. I born being citizen. 
I love our country very much. I feel comfortable being Estonian citizen.” This is interesting to 
note, that for people without clear social and cultural affinity to Estonian state, citizenship is 
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securitizing their status and their right to consider Estonia as home. “From point of view of 
Russian-speaking Ida-Virumaa resident, citizenship is a ticket of security, which will not let 
anyone to say that I do not belong to this country.”, states respondent from Kohtla-Järve.  
Most of the respondents from this category have been studying in Russian-language 
schools. However, half of them can speak Estonian language on average level. “I speak badly 
for Estonian resident, but good enough not to feel inconveniences.”, says one of the respondents. 
Most of them do not have close Estonian friends, even if they do, they prefer to communicate 
with them in Russian or English. Because of the difference in mentality and interests, they think 
that it is harder to find common language with Estonians and this is the reason why they prefer 
to communicate in their free time with Russian-speakers. Nevertheless, some of them would 
like to find Estonian friends to learn language. Answering question about friendship preferences, 
one respondent says, “I would prefer Estonian friend to learn Estonian language, but it is hard, 
they do not want to strain communicating with Russians.”. Respondents from this category 
usually use Estonian language only for work, when it is necessary.  They read books, newspaper, 
watch movies in Russian and English. They do not have clear preferences in nationality of 
colleagues. Indeed, they find advantages and disadvantages in working with Estonians and 
Russians. “Russian tend to hold in groups, they take care and support each other. Estonians are 
more restrained, but they usually do everything correctly and obey the law.”, says respondent 
from Tallinn. Russians often cross the line between work and private life and also sometimes 
they do things in sneaky ways, this is how some respondents explain their preference to work 
with Estonians. Their level of trust rather depends on origin of the person than on their mother 
tongue. “It does not matter what language one speaks, what matters is where one is from. I would 
trust local person more, than person from Russia.”, says respondent from Tallinn. 
None of the respondents from this category expressed wish to move to Russia, they all 
want to stay in Estonia, having distinct reasons for it. Some of them think that living standards 
in Estonia are higher, others are not satisfied with current political situation in Russia. Among 
other reasons for staying in Estonia is big local Russian community and possibility to use mother 
tongue in daily life. “If here would not be so many Russian-speaker, I would consider moving 
as an option. As far as it is possible to communicate here in Russian language there is no reason 
to change the country of residence.”, describes the situation respondent from Tallinn. Almost all 
respondents from this category consider that Estonian language is very important for their 
children. Most of them would send children to Estonian-language school. Knowledge of Russian 
language for their children respondents consider practically important, as in Estonia it may be 
beneficial as well. Nevertheless, they do not feel necessity to prevail any ties to Russian culture 
49 
 
to their children, sometimes because they do not have them themselves. “I do not consider 
myself Russian, and I do not have ties with Russian culture, how can I prevail it to children”.  
Culturally this category of respondents is more integrated to Estonian culture than the 
first one and have fewer connections with Russian traditions and culture.  Such events like 8 
March, 9 May do not have any significance for them. On the other hand, many of them have 
participated in Estonian Song Festivals and celebration of Independence Day. Although they did 
it because of the interest or respect to Estonian culture, as culture of others. “I attend patriotic 
events to better understand surrounding me people”, says respondent from Kohtla-Järve. This 
shows that even if they feel interest to some extent to Estonian culture, they do not consider it, 
as something own, rather as a foreign (local) culture. Even though, this category of respondents 
follows some Estonian   traditions, Russian cinematography, art, music and literature remains 
preferable for them. “Our parents are carriers of Slavic culture. They gave us the culture that 
they received from their parents and it is in no way Estonian. That is why we are far from 
Estonian culture and do not understand it.”, adds respondent from Kohtla-Järve.  Culturally 
Russian-speakers in Estonia as national minority are in quite special situation, where they live 
in cultural space of ethnocultural homeland that is much wider than cultural space of their host 
country. Often there is much bigger option in movies, books and music in Russian language, 
those it is easier to find something they like. “I love fantasy, but I do not know any Estonian 
fantasy writer.”, regrets respondent. Nevertheless, following Russia’s culture, they do not follow 
Russia’s information sources. They prefer Estonian media, broadcasting in Russian language. 
In addition to this, the interest of this category of respondents are not necessarily limited with 
Russian cultural space. Many of them prefer, Western artists, musicians and cinematography.  
This category of respondents stays culturally and nationally between Estonia and Russia. 
Their affinity is determined not by feeling of belongingness, but rather by feeling of alienation.  
Even if they would like to affiliate themselves with Estonia, they realize that social and cultural 
background differ them from Estonians. In the same time, they do not feel national affinity to 
Russia, once again because of the difference in mentality between Russian-speaking Estonians 
and Russians. Many of them do not accept Russia as own ethnocultural homeland, however they 
rather live in Russian cultural space than in Estonian. This group is clearly representing national 
minority as an actor of Brubaker’s triadic nexus model, where their identity does not clearly 
belong neither to host country nor to claimed ethnocultural homeland. 
The attitude towards Estonian security and defence policy is relatively positive among 
this category of respondents. Their average attitudinal index is 0.36, it is higher than the average 
of the focus group 0,2. Their opinions about Estonian deference and security policy are mostly 
positive or neutral. 
50 
 
Half of the respondents trust Estonian Defence Forces and half of them do not. Those 
people, who trust Estonian Defence Forces consider them as a tool to protect the state 
“apparatus”, the system and order that they are satisfied with. As respondent from Kohtla-Järve 
says, “They defend the state apparatus, that I am satisfied with.”.  At the same time, none of the 
respondents from this category finds that Estonian Defence Forces protect their personal security 
or their home. This is also the reasons, why half of respondents did not express confidence in 
defence forces.  They believe, that there is no threat to protect them from, those currently there 
is no point in Defence Forces.  “There is no direct threat, I do not see necessity in protection 
from their side”, articulates respondent from Kohtla-Järve. Nevertheless, almost all respondents 
from this category support the maintenance of own defence forces. Among the main reasons 
were: “Just in case”; “Any country needs it”; “They may help in difficult situation”; “They are 
needed to protect inner security, we have nothing to oppose to potential threat from outside”.  
This shows, that the respondents do not believe that Estonian defence forces have capability to 
protect them from the foreign aggression, however, most of them would not protest the existence 
of Estonian defence forces due to necessity to protect inner security in case of extraordinary 
situation. Most of the respondents from this category think that military service is prestigious, 
due to the new skills that conscripts gain and the difficulties they overcome.  In the same time, 
they do not think that males in Estonia have any moral obligation to protect the country, it is 
rather questionable formal requirement. Less than half of the respondents support obligatory 
conscription. “I did not serve, they almost took me in my last year of university, it would be a 
big loss for me.”, says respondent from this category. Some of the respondents do not support 
obligatory conscription, because they find that this system is obsolete and do not correspond to 
current needs and realities. The respondent, who has been conscribed says  
This is an absolute nonsense, even in Russia there are talks about moving to professional 
contract army. This is only legacy of old traditions, just on the higher level no one has 
enough political braveness to eliminate this. Maybe because it could disappoint people 
over 50, 60 years old, for whom military service was something important. 
An interesting fact that most of the respondents from this category who were conscribed, 
have quite critical attitudes towards military service. Answering the question, whether military 
service is prestigious, they answer: “As far as you have not been to army, it could seem so. I 
think 90% of those who have done it are disappointed. The reputation of army decline, because 
there are working bad people and the system is rusty”.  
The attitudes toward Defence League are mainly positive or neutral among this category 
of respondents. Thy support Defence League more than Defence Forces, because it is voluntary 
organisation. Some of the respondents have friends among members of Defence League, that 
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makes the organization trustworthy for them. Nevertheless, some of the respondents feel certain 
level of concern about this organization due to the fact, that almost everyone can join it and 
control mechanisms are unclear. The fact that person holds a gun, does not mean, that one is 
able to protect others. “How can I trust them, if anyone can join the Defecne League? It can be 
dummy, sick person, or just a fanatic.”, says respondent from Tallinn. All things considered 
respondents from this category generally support the maintenance of Defence League, but only 
two of them trust, that organization would protect their security in case of threat.  
The attitudes toward NATO among this category of the respondents are slightly more 
positive than among the category “closer to Russia”.  All respondents from current category 
relate to NATO positively or neutrally and most of them think that Estonia must be in NATO. 
Nevertheless, they express doubts in NATO’s ability and wish to protect Estonia and its’ people 
in case of military conflict. Less than half of the respondents believe that NATO will help 
Estonia to defend. Moreover, even if they do, it would be in sake of own geopolitical interests 
in opinion of several respondents. “NATO protects own geopolitical interests, nobody actually 
cares about Estonian people”, “They will protect Estonia, because if they do not, other countries 
will also doubt in NATO’s defensive capabilities”, explain respondents. The opinions about 
enlargement of NATO’s presence in Estonia were divided. Half of the respondent support 
expansion of NATO’s presence in Estonia, especially those, who at some point relate themselves 
as a subject of NATO’s protection. “They did not forget us”, says one respondent, whose attitude 
towards NATO is the most positive among the category. This can indicate, that if person feels 
personal protection by institution, one’s support to the institution and trust tend to be higher. 
Others, who do not feel the same, do not support NATO’s enhanced forward presence in Estonia. 
They say, “If they are here in the peaceful time, that means that somebody needs it. I do not 
support.”, “They have thousands of soldiers, and they must give them work, what leads to 
additional expenditures. Moreover, it can be perceived as provocation and showing off.”. 
Nevertheless, the opinion about NATO presence as provocation is not widely spread among this 
category of respondents. Most of them do not feel tensions between Russia and Estonia, those 
they do think that NATO presence in Estonia is directed against Russia.  
This category of respondents rather believes that in case of armed conflict military 
defence is necessary. Most of them highlight two reasons for this. The first one, that their 
relatives and friends are here and would need the protection. The second, quite outstanding 
reason, is that they do not want to live in Russia. Several respondents came up with opinion like, 
“Armed resistance is necessary. I do not want to live in Russia.”. Once again this shows how 
the level of affinity may determine the political stances and preferences. In this case week 
affinity to claimed enthnocultural homeland makes people to stand on the side of host state in 
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case of international tensions. However, this category having competing identity, neither feel 
strong affinity to Estonia. This can determine their personal will to defend host state in case of 
armed conflict. Few of the respondents expressed their readiness to personally participate in 
national defence in case of military conflict.  Even fewer are ready to protect Estonia in case of 
armed conflict with Russia. “It would be terrible. I would run from here.”, “I have relatives in 
Russia and Belarus, I would not take any side in this conflict.”, they say. 
All things considered, the category of respondents, whose affinity is in the middle 
between Russia and Estonia did not show great protest to Estonian security and defence policy, 
most of them relate to Estonian security and defence policy positively or neutrally. If we divide 
all focus group accordingly to their attitudes also in three categories, where the most negative 
group has average attitudinal index ranging from -1 to -0.25, neutral has average attitudinal 
index ranging from -0.25 to +0.25 and the most positive group has average attitudinal index 
ranging from +0.25 to +1, then only 1 respondents out of 7 will fall under category “the most 
negative”, 2 “neural” and 4 “the most positive”.  The most negative attitude can be explained 
by bad personal experience connected with conscription. Having no clear affinity male 
respondents from this group may be solved being forced to serve certain state.  Their attitude 
towards security and defence policy can be described as positive until the situation does not 
directly affect them. Having competing identity far from both host state and claimed 
ethnocultural homeland, the do not care about geopolitical interests of both states. They are 
ready to support Estonian security and defence policy as far as it protects status quo. However, 
most of them do not feel that Defence Forces, Defence League and NATO protect their personal 
interests and security. At the same time, they neither feel that Russia would represent their 
interests. In this competition of loyalties, they rather prefer Estonian, but not because of great 
patriotic feelings, but because Estonian order seems for them more convenient than Russian.  To 
conclude, the attitudes of this category of respondents are the most pragmatic.  
2.4.2.3 Category – closer to Estonia 
This category of respondents has the strongest affinity to Estonia. This is the smallest 
category of respondents only 6 people out of 25, what makes 24% of the focus group. Their 
affinity index is ranging from 0.25 to 1 (on a scale where 1 is complete affinity to Estonia and -
1 is full affinity to Russia.  Most of them consider themselves Estonians, half-Estonians or 
Russian-speaking Estonians. All these types of identities indicate that person firstly identifies 
oneself with Estonia and only then adds specification. A very interesting type of identity gave a 
respondent from this group, she calls herself “Rustonian”, what means Russian-speaking person 
born in Estonia, without Russian mentality, but still not Estonian. She explains that this type of 
identity is widely used among creative Russian-speaking youngsters (artists, musicians) from 
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her social circles.  Respondents, who strongly claim that they are Estonians, have distinct 
reasons for this. Some respondents explain it by the place of birth and life, “I know Russian 
language, but all my life I live in Estonia”. For others strong Estonian identity is related to their 
national/political stances. A respondent from Narva explains his identity in this way:  
Even though, my parents were born and grown up in Estonia, Ida-Virumaa county, they 
never spoke Estonian and did not know Estonian culture. When I was a kid, they always 
said that I am Russian. I had always fight in my mind, why I am Russian and live in 
Estonia. My position formed when I was a teenager. I started to argue with parents on 
political topics about language, Estonia, Russia and Putin. In these disputes I positioned 
myself as Estonian. If one does not like something, one can go live to Russia. 
For many respondents there was a certain moment in their life, that changed their 
identity. Mostly it was connected to the change of language environment. “When I moved to 
Tallinn and started to communicate more with Estonians, I started to identify myself more as 
Estonian.”; “When I was in military camp, I positioned myself as Estonian. I spoke with 
everyone in Estonian language and they though I am Estonian. There was no need to say that I 
am not.”, explain respondents from this category. For these category of respondents, opponent 
does not determine their identity. Communicating with Estonian, foreigners or being in Russia, 
most of them would say that they are Estonians. “In Russia they always ask me, why do I speak 
Russian so well. This makes me laugh.”, says respondent from Jõhvi. An interesting fact that to 
this category fall respondents from the cities with relatively big proportion of Estonian-speaking 
population, such as Jõhvi, Tapa or Pärnu, Notwithstanding the fact, that they would like to 
identify themselves as Estonians, it is not always accepted by native Estonians. “You do not 
affiliate yourself with Russia, but representatives of titular nation do not affiliate you with 
themselves. Even if they will not say it directly to you, statements of politicians and media make 
you understand it quite clearly.”, says respondent from Pärnu. To describe the situation he uses 
famous Russian phrasing, what in direct translation to English would be “Own among others, 
other among owns”.  
For most of the respondents from this category citizenship is a significant part of their 
identity and affinity to Estonian state. Being Estonian citizens, they accept not only the rights 
that passport gives them, but also the obligations, as for instance to defend Estonia in case of 
threat. They consider citizenship as a right for legal, moral and national belongingness. “Holding 
Estonian passport, I am Estonian citizen of full value with all rights. I do not feel oppression or 
inequality. I feel national belongingness. Even though, I am Russian I consider myself 
Estonian.”, says respondent from Kohtla-Järve. For some of them citizenship plays the key role 
in their identity, the respondent from Tapa always answers to the question about nationality “I 
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am Estonian citizen”. In this situation citizenship becomes an identity itself. For others 
citizenship is a part of their political stance. One of the respondents from current category has a 
double citizenship.  He had Russian citizenship, because his parents are Russian citizens, but he 
had roots from Estonia coming from the period before 1940. Those, he had a right for the 
citizenship by birth. He was the first from his family, who decided to take Estonian citizenship 
to prove that he is Estonian. “My dad always told me, you are Russian citizen, how can you be 
Estonian? I decided, if so, I will take Estonian passport.”, he says. On the other hand, even 
Estonian passport cannot always guarantee acceptance of Estonian identity of Russian-speakers 
by Estonians. “At some point born here you want to be and to feel yourself as Estonian citizen 
but listening politicians and following Estonian media you realize that you are not welcomed.”, 
says respondent who had Estonian citizenship from birth.  
All the respondents from this category are fluent in Estonian language. Most of them 
were studying in Estonian language schools, or in Russian-language schools on programs with 
mixed language of instructions, so called “Diving” classes. They communicate with friends, 
colleagues and course mates in Estonian and constantly use Estonian language in their daily 
lives. They do not make difference in people to communicate with in free time, but slightly 
prefer to work with Estonians, because of Estonian mentality and correctness in work. They 
follow Estonian mass-media in Estonian language but would rather prefer to read books and 
watch movies in Russian language. They are ready to work and receive meaningful information 
in Estonian language, but in leisure time find it more convenient to use Russian language.  The 
preference of using Russian language in leisure time means, that notwithstanding the fluency in 
Estonian, the level on convenience using the language is not the same as for mother tongue.   
Speaking about future plans, most of the respondents are going to connect their life with 
Estonia. None of them wish to move to Russia. Being in Russia they feel uneasy, as in totally 
foreign country with different mentality and culture. As respondent from Jõhvi explains, “This 
is what differs Rustonians from Russians.  For Russians it is silent and boring in Estonia, for 
Rustonians it is scary and noisy in Russia.” This underlines the perceived difference in mentality 
between Russian-speaking Estonians and Russians from Russia. All respondents from this 
category find that Estonian language would be very important for their kids to integrate to 
society and be competitive on the labour market. However, they find Estonian language 
important only as long as they live in Estonia. What indicates that the relation to Estonian 
language is serious, but still not the same as to mother tongue in which they would communicate 
with kids wherever they would live.  Nevertheless, they would not care about the level of 
Russian language proficiency for their kids.  “It would be fine, if they would know it at least 
badly, from me.”, says respondent from Kohtla-Järve. Respondents do not see the necessity and 
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ability to raise their children in Russian cultural traditions, since they do not consider themselves 
as carriers of these traditions. Some of the respondents expressed their wish to familiarize their 
children with Estonian culture. Interesting to note, that they are going to do it, even if they would 
live abroad. What means, that while Estonian language for them seems important only in 
Estonia, then Estonian culture became a part of their identity that they want to carry and pass to 
their children, does not matter where they are going to live. Here appears the phenomenon of 
the second or third transnational generation, who becomes a carrier of language of ethnocultural 
homeland and culture of host state.  
Most of the respondents are quite familiar with Estonian traditions and culture. The most 
important celebrations for them are the Estonian Christmas and St John's Day (Jaanipäev), 
which is one of the most important days in the Estonian calendar, after Christmas. Only one 
respondent mentioned the 9 May. Generally, “Russian” celebrations were not important for the 
respondents from this category. Most of them participated in main Estonian patriotic events, 
such as Song Festivals and celebration of Independence Day. For some of them these events 
have personal patriotic significance. “The parade on Independence Day inspires me. It makes 
me feel the greatness of the country I live.”, says respondent from Tallinn. Notwithstanding, the 
claimed patriotic significance, we still can see some alienation in wording. Instead of saying, 
“my/our country” respondent says, “the country I live”. This indicates, that participant 
experiences certain patriotic feelings, but not the feeling of ownership or belongingness towards 
Estonia. In other words, one loves the country, but the country of others, not one’s own.  
Culturally this category of respondents is quite versatile. In concert with following 
Russian and Western pop culture, respondents are familiar with Estonian modern culture. Some 
of the respondents listen more Estonian music, than Russian and watch Estonian movies. The 
most drastic cultural difference from previous two categories was in literature preferences and 
knowledge. More than half of the respondents from this category red more Estonian authors, 
than Russian. Some prefer to read in Estonian language. This difference may be caused by the 
education in Estonian-language schools, where pupils read more Estonian authors than Russian 
and read only in Estonian language.  
The attitude of respondents from this category towards Estonian security and defence 
policy is the most positive of the focus group. Their average attitudinal index is 0.37, while 
average of all focus group is 0,2 and it is also slightly higher that the attitudinal index of previous 
category 0,36. Their opinions about Estonian defence and security policy are only positive and 
neutral.  
All the respondents from this category think that Estonia must have own Defence Forces. 
Nevertheless, they see it necessary rather for the country than for them personally. “As Estonia 
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was under the occupations, now this is a reasonable defensive reaction”, says respondent from 
Kohtla-Järve. In addition to this, respondents express doubts about defensive capability of 
Estonian Defence Forces. While half of the respondents trust Estonian Defence Forces, another 
half is not sure that Estonia would be able to defend own security in terms of modern warfare. 
“The forces that we have cannot be opposed to the forces of our neighbour in whom Estonia 
sees the threat.”, says respondent from Kothla-Järve. In this sentence both mistrust to national 
defence capabilities and doubts about potential threat can be noted. Some of the respondents 
think that the level of threat is overestimated and there is no need to spend so much money on 
defence.  However, all of them believe that Estonia needs obligatory conscription for males. 
They explain it by the size of the country and small population. “If it will not be obligatory, no 
one would go to serve”, they say. Most of the respondents consider it prestigious to serve in 
Defence Forces, but rather in terms of personal development, not because of national defence. 
None of the respondents from this category have been conscribed, but some express their interest 
and potential will to try military service or at least to know more about it. 
This category of respondents also supports the maintenance of the Defence League. Most 
of them think that this is good and necessary institution. Some respondents from this group 
expressed not only support to Defence League, but also certain level of respect to its’ members. 
“People who wish to protect own county are worth the respect.”, says respondent from Tallinn. 
An interesting division between the attitude to Defence Forces and Defence League gave one of 
the respondents from this category, “Serving in Defence Forces is a duty, but in Defence League 
is a respect to own country.”.  Nevertheless, there were respondents who expressed certain 
doubts about the professionalism and morality of members of the Defence League. “It may be a 
good hobby, but I have heard about militant madmen in this organization.”, says respondent 
from Kothla-Järve. This may also be the reason, why respondents do not feel personal protection 
by Defence League. None of them agreed that Defence League protects them personally, they 
rather believe that Defence Forces would protect them.  
This category of respondents has slightly less positive attitude towards NATO than 
towards national defence capabilities. Their attitudes towards Estonian allies is closely 
correlated with their threat perception. None of the respondents considered Russia as a direct 
threat, but mainly they expressed worries about relations between Russia and Estonian allies, 
first of all the US. The grow of tensions between Russia and the West is perceived as the main 
threat to their security. This group of respondents would support Estonian collaboration both 
with Russia and the West but find that Estonian membership in EU and NATO impede Estonian 
flexibility in foreign affairs. At certain degree it affects the attitude of the respondents towards 
Estonian allies. Especially, when we are speaking about enhanced forward presence. “I am 
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afraid that this provokes Russia to attack our country.”, “A potential threat, considers opposite 
side as potential threat.”, “I am not sure, whether it is a threat for Russia, but it is not a favor for 
Estonia.”, “It serves the interests of the US, Estonian interests are not represented here.”, explain 
respondents from this category. It is interesting to note, that they do care about the interest of 
Estonia as a state, but their vision of Estonian interests differs from the vision of native Estonians 
at certain level. (78% of Estonians think that NATO battlegroup has made Estonia more secure. 
(Kivirähk, 2017, 7)) Respondents generally do not believe that NATO will help Estonia in case 
of military conflict, but most of them still think that membership is nevertheless needed. “If 
Estonia would be alone, our Defence Forces would be too unstable.”, says respondent from 
Tapa. It was especially interesting to ask opinion about NATO from Tapa resident, as in Tapa 
is located the biggest contingent of allies in Estonia. Resident of Tapa, who lives near the 
military base and had direct contacts with NATO soldiers, finds them friendly and well-behaved. 
In his opinion presence of NATO troops in Tapa is advantageous for the city, it stimulates 
emergence of new SMEs. The only critique he expressed, was that when new battle group came 
to Tapa, allies’ troops were roomed in barracks, to do so Estonian soldiers were forced to live 
11 months in tents and forests.  He finds it unfair in relation to Estonians soldiers.  
All things considered, this category of respondents rather supports Estonian security and 
defence policy. If we divide all focus group accordingly to their attitudes in three categories, 
where the most negative group has average attitudinal index ranging from -1 to -0.25, neutral 
has average attitudinal index ranging from -0.25 to +0.25 and the most positive group has 
average attitudinal index ranging from +0.25 to +1, then only 1 respondents out of 6 falls under 
category “the most negative”, 1 “neural” and 4 “the most positive”. All respondents said that 
armed resistance would be necessary for Estonia in case of military conflict. Most of the 
respondents are ready to stand up for Estonian security and participate in state defence no matter 
who will attack.  Answering question, what you are going to do if Russia attacks, respondent 
from Jõhvi said, “If my friend stab me, I will need to fight back.”. In general, this group of 
respondents in concert with stronger affinity to Estonia showed that they care about Estonia 
stability and wish to contribute to Estonian prosperity as to prosperity of own country.  At the 
same time there are several obstacles that do not let most of the respondents to feel as full valued 
citizens. Caring about Estonia, they also care about its’ security and defence, but often they have 
own vision on security and defence policy, which tend to differ from the vision of titular nation. 
Their answers lead to the conclusion, that this difference of visions is determined by the 
difference of threat perception.  
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2.4.3 Summary of categorical analysis 
The findings of current research and comparison of the affinity and attitudinal indexes 
confirm the hypothesis that young Russian-speakers’ attitudes toward security and defence vary 
as a function of citizenship, level of identification with Estonia (as opposed to the ethnocultural 
homeland) and individual integration into the Estonian society. Each respondent was personally 
evaluated by affinity and attitudinal indexes. Affinity index was composed accordingly to the 
connotation of the answers respondents gave to the questions related to their cultural, social and 
linguistic background. Attitudinal index was composed accordingly to the connotation of the 
answers respondents gave to the questions related to their opinions about Estonian Defence 
Forces, Defence League, NATO, conscription, threat perception etc. All respondents were 
divided into three categories accordingly to their personal affinity indexes: Closer to Russia, 
Between Russia and Estonia and Closer to Estonia, and personal attitudinal indexes: the Most 
negative, Neutral and the Most positive. The comparison of the categories shows that 
participants with affinity closer to Russia have less positive attitudes to Estonian security and 
defence policy than the respondents with affinity closer to Estonia. (see Figure 6.) 
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Figure 6. Distribution of attitudes towards Estonian defence and security policy by level of 
affinity to Estonia/Russia 
Three categories of respondents showed slightly different attitudes toward Estonian 
Defence Forces. The category “Closer to Russia”, whose personal affinity with Estonian state is 
rather weak do not trust Defence Forces. In the situation where Defence Forces are directed 
against Russian threat, respondents who have stronger affinity to Russia than to Estonia do not 
see that this defence makes sense, as personally they do not feel any threat from Russia. They 
do not believe that Defence Forces are able and going to protect them personally, their homes 
and families. This group of respondents do not support obligatory conscription. Many of them 
find it not fair, that person is obliged to be ready to “die for the state”. In this situation the lack 
of affinity to host state determines the lack of support to its’ Defence Forces, especially if they 
are opposed to claimed threat from ethnocultural homeland. The second category of the 
respondents, whose identity does not belong neither to host state nor to claimed ethnocultural 
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homeland, showed greater support to Estonian Defence Forces. Having neutral self-identity, this 
category of respondents feel affinity rather to the place and the system where they live, than to 
the nation state. This group does neither feel affinity to claimed ethnocultural homeland, those 
they are not sensitive to its’ geopolitical interests. As far as Defence Forces protect the state 
apparatus and status quo, this category of respondents will support the maintenance of Defence 
Forces. In accordance with this some of them also will support the obligatory conscription. 
Nevertheless, only half of the respondents trust that Estonian Defence Forces are able to deter 
foreign threat. The last category, whose affinity is the closest to Estonia showed the highest 
support to Estonian Defence Forces. Respondents of this category feel personal affinity not only 
to the place they live, but also to the nation state. Those they care more about its’ security and 
prosperity. Their affinity and national identity have no connection with claimed ethnocultural 
homeland. Taking into consideration both facts, they partly share the believe in Russian threat, 
what determines their higher support to Estonian Defence Forces. All respondents from this 
category consider that obligatory conscription is necessary in Estonia. Having not only practical, 
but also emotional/national affinity to the host state, several respondents from this group 
expressed the opinion that citizen has moral obligation to protect own country. This approach is 
totally different from the first two categories, who considered military service rather as an 
opportunity to develop personal skills and a questionable formal obligation.  
The attitudes toward Defence League were rather positive and supportive among all three 
categories. The main reason for this was that this institution is voluntary and does not oblige 
anyone. Nevertheless, certain worries about nationalistic character of this organization appeared 
among respondents. Especially sensitive to some nationalistic statements of the representatives 
of Defence League were respondents from category “Closer to Russia”. In concert with their 
general support to the organization, its’ perceived nationalistic incline makes respondents 
disbelieve that Defence League would defend them personally. The second category of 
respondents is more integrated to Estonian society and has winder social circles. This may be 
the reason why some of them have personal connections in Defence League. People who have 
friends among members of the organization, trust the Defence League more than others. The 
third category of respondent once again showed the highest support to Estonian defence 
institution. The respondents from the category who feel national affinity to Estonian state where 
the only ones who expressed not only support to existence of the organization but also respect 
to its’ members. They find it honorable that people contribute their time and energy to protect 
own country. Nevertheless, all three categories of respondents at some point expressed doubts 
about professionalism of the Defence League. 
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The most negative attitude towards NATO was among participants from the category 
“Closer to Russia”. While at certain degree they are ready to support Estonian Defence Forces 
and Defence League, NATO seems for them unnecessary organization directed against Russia. 
Having stronger affinity to Russia, most of them are concerned that Russia’s forces are much 
stronger and military expansion of NATO is dangerous provocation and unnecessary waste of 
money. They do not believe that NATO has capabilities and will to defend Estonia. There is 
widely spread perception among this category that NATO works in the interest of the US. 
Especially critically this category of respondents relates to NATO’s participation in joint 
military operations. This may be caused by the fact, that respondents from this category mostly 
use Russia’s information sources and their social circles are limited by Russian speakers. Having 
mostly Russian identity they tend to share Russia’s values and vision on international order, 
which nowadays are often opposed to the Western values and geopolitical visions. This leads to 
the opposition between Russia (as something own) and West (as something others’). In this 
situation, the activities conducted by “others” in the interests of “others” are often perceived in 
a negative light. Hence the relation to these “others” is also negative, especially when it is 
opposed to “owns”. For the category “Closer to Russia”, Russia is rather own, and NATO is 
rather others’. The attitudes to NATO among the second category of respondents were not so 
univocal. Having competing identity they neither consider NATO nor Russia as something own. 
They tend to believe that NATO works in its’ own geopolitical interest, without care about 
Estonian interests.  However, being satisfied with current status quo, they rather support NATO 
and Estonian membership as far as NATO serves as a guarantee of protection of current status. 
Half of the respondents from this category support enhanced forward presence, if it helps to 
protect their own security. Respondents from the category “In the middle” do not share Russia’s 
views on global order and do not care about Russia’s geopolitical interests. Those, they do not 
think that NATO presence in Estonia is a direct threat for Russia and provocation. The attitudes 
to NATO among the category “Closer to Estonia” were rather positive. However, being the 
category who feels the affinity to Estonia, they express worries about Estonian security. They 
believe that Estonian membership in NATO is needed, but afraid that expansion of NATO may 
cause problems for Estonian security. In this sense, the last category partly shares views on 
NATO enhanced forward presence with the first category, but for different reasons. When the 
first category disagrees with expansion of NATO presence because they consider it as a threat 
to Russia, the last category is afraid that it may cause problems for Estonia. Some respondents 
from this category think that being allied Estonia is losing political flexibility and independence 
in decision making process.  
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Finally, the empirical analysis shows that the more person culturally and socially 
integrated, the more coherent one’s views are with Estonian security and defence policy. The 
feeling of affinity makes person more appreciate own country and care more about its’ security. 
For people with closer social ties with local native community, proficiency in language and 
stronger cultural affinity there is more reasons to protect the country. The conducted interviews 
showed that respondents with stronger affinity to Estonia believe more that armed resistance 
would be necessary in case of military conflict than respondents without affinity or with stronger 
affinity to Russia. If respondents with stronger affinity to Russia rather think that armed 
resistance is not necessary at all, respondents without affinity would leave the country as soon 
as possible, then the respondents with stronger affinity to Estonia would support armed 
resistance and many of them would be ready to personally participate in state defence no matter 
who is the opponent. All things considered, among all factors mentioned in current research, 
self-identity and threat perception most outstandingly determine attitudes toward security and 
defence policy. The interviews disclosed that in Estonia, self-identity of Russian-speaking youth 
is strongly influenced by their social and linguistic environment, family and proficiency of 
Estonian language. School often plays the key role in creation of social circles, person who was 
studying in Estonian school often communicates and interacts with Estonians more also after 
graduation. In most cases communication with Estonians and acceptance by natives determines 
more Estonian self-identity. Respondents with Estonian self-identity were more supportive to 
Estonian security and defence policy. This shows how level of social and cultural integration 
may determine the attitudinal integration. Threat perception being one of key factors influencing 
the attitudes toward security and defence policy is closely correlated with self-identity. 
Respondents who identify themselves mostly as Russians do not consider Russia as a threat. 
Those, the aspects of Estonian security and defence policy directed to deterrence of Russian 
threat do not find support among this group of respondents. This shows how national affinity to 
Russia through threat perception may determine the attitudes toward Estonian security and 
defence.  
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Conclusion 
 
In this research the attitudes toward Estonian security and defence policy among the 
Russian-speaking youth in Estonia were examined through the theoretical lens of 
transnationalism and triadic nexus models. This work created additional knowledge about the 
attitudes that prevail among young Russian-speakers in the field of defence and security. This 
should help not only to analyse achievements of current integration policy, but also to draw 
attention to potential problems of societal resilience in Estonia country. 
The research shows, that transnationalism is still relevant in case of Russian-speaking 
youth in Estonia. Notwithstanding the quite broad and open mindset of young Russian-speakers, 
they tend to live in a Russian cultural space rather than Estonian. Even respondents with strong 
affinity to Estonia expressed preference to follow Russia’s modern culture. In this sense, 
Russian-speakers in Estonia are an example of quite a special situation, where the cultural space 
of claimed ethnocultural homeland often appears wider than cultural space of host state, thus 
offering a broader range of options and spurring greater interest. While most of young Russian-
speakers are not first generation of migrants, they still follow Russian traditions coming from 
their families. However, most of young Russian-speakers consider Russia as a foreign country, 
but Estonia as their homeland. According to transnationalism theory, transmigrants tend to 
create transboundary social spaces, communicating with their friends and families living abroad. 
For Estonian Russian-speaking youth, this is only partly relevant as their communication with 
Russia’s residents is often limited by relatives. Nevertheless, the interviews showed that a 
Russian-speaking young person can still meet obstacles in making friends with Estonians. Thus, 
the young Russian-speaking community is still socially segregated from their Estonian 
counterparts. These transnational features of Russian-speaking youth in Estonia often influence 
their level of affinity to either Estonia or Russia. In the situation, where young Russian-speakers 
have only cultural ties with Russia, but still are not fully integrated into Estonian society, Russia 
becomes a source of their cultural and national identity and Estonia a source of legal identity.  
When there are certain tensions between Estonia and Russia, the competing identities of 
young Russian-speakers raise questions about their loyalty. The situation in Estonian 
corresponds to Brubaker’s (1996) Triadic Nexus model, where Russian-speakers are between 
growing inclusive policy of host country and exhortations from claimed ethnocultural homeland. 
While Russian-speakers do not always self-identify with Russia, it nonetheless targets them as 
own ethnonational kin. When young Russian-speaker receive contradictive messages from 
Russia’s (sometimes through families or social circles) and Estonia, the affinity often determines 
their final attitudes to political questions. This thesis found that young Russian-speakers’ 
attitudes toward Estonian security and defence policy vary as a function of citizenship, level of 
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identification with Estonia (as opposed to claimed ethnocultural homeland) and individual 
integration into the Estonian society. The examination of the attitudes and personal reasons of 
the respondents showed that national affinity, self-identity, social and cultural background of 
Estonian young Russian-speaker can significantly determine one’s attitudes toward security and 
defence policy. Respondents with stronger affinity to Estonia showed more supportive attitudes 
towards national security and defence, than their counterparts with stronger affinity to Russia. 
Respondents with Estonian self-identity, who are more familiar with Estonian culture and have 
higher proficiency in Estonian language support more Estonian defence institutions and 
membership in NATO. On the opposite, respondents with rather Russian or neutral self-identity 
who are culturally and socially more alienated from Estonia expressed less interest to national 
defence. 
All things considered, as Brubaker (2011) wrote, transnational minority is a dynamic 
political stance, not a static ethnodemographic condition. The general attitudes of young 
Russian-speakers were closely related to the social and cultural environment they were raised 
and live in. I believe that by improving the environment, it is possible to influence the affinity.  
Mutual understanding, tolerance and social integration would help young Russian-speakers to 
feel themselves more as full-valued citizens which, in turn, would enhance their affinity to 
Estonia. Russian-speakers compose a significant part of Estonian younger generation, and those 
their integration has a long-term effect on social cohesion. Undoubtedly, cohesion in society is 
one of the key pillars of national defence and security. Hence, the affinity and attitudinal 
integration of young Russian-speakers become an important aspect for national defence that 
merits attention and improvement. All in all, most of Estonian Russian-speakers consider 
Estonia their home. Planning to connect their future with Estonia, they also want to make it a 
better and safer place to live.  
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Appendix 1. Introductory text shown to respondents    
Thank you for your readiness to take part in the research “Transnationalism and 
attitudinal integration: Russian-speaking youth and Estonian Security and Defence policy”. 
Спасибо Вам за согласие принять участие в исследовании «Транснационализм и 
интеграция мнений: Русскоязычная молодёжь и Эстонская политика обороны и 
безопасности.» 
My name is Nikita Lumijõe, I am MA second year student at the University of Tartu in 
the European Union – Russia studies program. This interview is a practical part of my MA thesis 
and I very appreciate your contribution.  
Меня зовут Никита Лумйыэ, и я студент второго курса магистратуры 
Тартуского Университета по специальности Европейско-Российские исследования. Это 
интервью является частью моей дипломной работы, и я буду крайне признателен за Ваш 
вклад в исследование.  
The aim of this research is to find out what Russian-speaking youth think about key 
aspects of Estonian security and defence policy, and how their attitudes are shaped by their 
identity and perceived affinity to Estonia and Russia. This research has the potential to bring 
new knowledge about societal cohesion in Estonia. The questions I will ask you concern your 
identity and background, your affinity to Estonia and Russia, and your opinions about Estonian 
security and defense policy. There are no right or wrong answers – what matters is your opinion 
and your opinions.   
Целью исследования ставиться – выяснить мнение Русскоязычной молодёжи 
касательно основных аспектов политики обороны и безопасности Эстонии, а также 
узнать насколько мнение зависит от само-позиционирования между Эстонией и 
Россией. Это исследование должно принести новые сведения об уровне социальной 
сплочённости Эстонии. Вопросы, которые я задам, затрагивают национальную 
самоидентификацию, личные характеристики и отношение к Эстонской политике 
обороны и безопасности. В данном случае не может быть правильных или неправильных 
ответов, важно лишь Ваше мнение и отношение.  
Participation in the interview is voluntarily. You may refuse answering any question or stop 
the interview at any time you want. All interviewees will remain anonymous. Your name will 
not be mentioned in the thesis or any other publications resulting from this research.  
Участие в интервью добровольное и анонимное. Вы можете отказаться 
отвечать на любой из вопросов или остановить интервью в любой момент, когда 
пожелаете. Ваше имя не будет указано ни в дипломной работе, ни в любых других 
публикациях этого исследования. 
66 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2. Interview structure 
Identity and background 
Самоидентификация и личные характеристики 
1. How old are you? Сколько Вам лет? 
2. Are you studying or working? What is you field of studies/job? Вы учитесь или 
работаете? На кого учитесь, кем работаете? 
3. How would you describe your identity? (Do you consider yourself to be Russian, Estonian, 
Estonian Russian, etc)? Кем Вы себя определяете? Вы считаете себя русским, эстонцем, 
эстонским русским? Почему Вы так считаете? 
4. Has your self-identification changed over time? How/why? Ваша самоидентификация 
менялась со временем? Каким образом/ Почему? 
5. How would you identify yourself when traveling abroad/speaking with a native Estonian/ 
when visiting Russia? Кем Вы себя определяете, будучи заграницей, общаясь с коренными 
эстонцами, посещая Россию? 
Affinity of the respondents to Estonia or Russia. Близость к Эстонии и России.  
1. Have you been studying in Russian or Estonian in school? На каком языке Вы учились в 
школе? 
2. How well do you speak Estonian language, how much do you use it in daily life 
(communicating with friend, colleagues, fellow-students), in what language do you prefer to 
watch or read news/movies/books? Как хорошо Вы говорите по эстонский, как много 
используете эстонский язык в повседневной жизни (общаясь с друзьями, коллегами, 
однокурсниками), на каком языке Вы предпочитаете смотреть фильмы, читать 
новости, книги?  
3. How much do you communicate at your work/school with Estonian- and how much with 
Russian-speakers. Can you roughly estimate the percentage? How much do you communicate 
in your private live with Estonian- and how much with Russian-speakers? Can you roughly 
estimate in percentage? Как много Вы общаетесь на работе/учёбе с эстонцами и как много 
с русскими? Можете приблизительно оценить в процентах? Как много Вы общаетесь в 
свободное время с эстонцами и как много с русскими? Можете приблизительно оценить 
в процентах? 
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Appendix 2 (continued) 
 
4. Whom would you prefer as a friend/colleague/fellow-students native Estonians/Russians, 
Russian-speaking Estonians, other? Whom do you trust more? Кого Вы бы предпочли видеть 
своим другом/коллегой/ однокурсником – коренного эстонца или русского? Кому Вы 
больше доверяете? 
 
5. How important would you consider knowledge of Estonian language for you children? 
What language of education would you prefer for your children? На сколько важным Вы 
считаете знание эстонского языка для своих детей? На каком языке Вы предпочли бы 
образование для своих детей? 
6. What is your current citizenship, what does it mean for you and what are the reasons for 
having this? Какого Ваше нынешнее гражданство? Что оно для Вас значит, какие 
причины иметь гражданство? 
7. What country do you prefer to live, study and work in? Why? How big probability that you 
will stay and work in Estonia? How big probability that you will search for studying or working 
opportunities in Russia?  Какую страну Вы бы предпочли для жизни, работы, учёбы? 
Насколько вероятно, что вы останетесь жить в Эстонии, на сколько вероятно, что 
будете искать возможности в России? 
8. What occasions do you usually celebrate, Estonian Independence Day/ Christmas 
(Orthodox Christmas), Victory day (9th May). What does this occasion mean for you? Have you 
ever participated in the The Estonian Song Festival (in Estonian: laulupidu), Victory day 
celebration (Immortal Regiment)? Do you like Estonian/Russian music, art, literature, movies? 
Which one would you prefer? Какие национальные праздники вы обычно отмечаете День 
независимости Эстонии, Рождество (Православное), День Победы (9 Мая)? Что для 
Вас значит этот праздник? Вы участвовали в Эстонских праздниках песни и танца? 
Празднование дня победы (Бессмертный полк)? Вам нравится Эстонское/Русское 
искусство, музыка, литература, фильмы? Что бы Вы предпочли? 
Attitudes toward Estonian security and defence policy 
Отношение к эстонской политике обороны и безопасности 
1. What image the Estonian Defence Forces have for you, positive, negative or neutral? Why? 
Do you trust Estonian Defence Forces? Do you consider them necessary?  
Как Вы относитесь к эстонским силам обороны? (позитивно, негативно, нейтрально) 
Почему? Вы доверяете эстонским силам обороны? Вы считаете необходимым для 
Эстонии иметь свои собственные силы обороны (армию)? 
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2. What do you think about the military service in Estonian Defence Forces, is it prestigious? 
Why? Have you been/would you like to go to army? Why? Do you consider obligatory military 
service necessary in Estonia (for men/women)? 
Как вы относитесь к срочной военной службе. Вы считаете, что проходить срочную 
службу, это престижно? Почему? Вы служили, собираетесь проходить службу? 
Почему? Вы считаете обязательную воинскую обязанность необходимой для Эстонии 
(для мужчин/женщин)   
3. Have you heard about the Estonian Defense League? What does this organization do? What 
image the Estonian Defence League has for you, positive, negative or neutral? Why? Do you 
trust the Defence League? Do you consider it necessary?  
Вы слышали о Союзе Обороны, представляете, чем занимается эта организация? Как 
Вы относитесь к Союзу Обороны? (позитивно, негативно, нейтрально) Почему? Вы 
доверяете Союзу Обороны? Вы считаете необходимым для Эстонии иметь Союз 
Обороны? 
4. What do you consider as a main threat to Estonian security? Что вы считаете главной 
угрозой для безопасности Эстонии? 
5. What is the image that NATO has for you (positive, negative or neutral)? Why? Do you 
consider Estonian membership in NATO necessary? Do you think that the membership in 
NATO is guaranteeing security for Estonia? Why? Как Вы относитесь к НАТО? (позитивно, 
негативно, нейтрально) Почему? Вы считаете необходимым для Эстонии состоять в 
НАТО? Вы считаете, что НАТО обеспечивает безопасность Эстонии? Почему? 
6. In 2016, NATO member states agreed to forward deploy multinational battalion battle 
groups to some NATO members, including Estonia. Since that time about 1300 NATO troops 
were deployed to Estonia. How do you feel about it? Do you support presence of NATO troops 
in Estonia? Why?  В 2016 году, страны, члены НАТО решили разместить дополнительные 
мультинациональные контингенты в ряде стран НАТО, включая Эстонию. С тех пор 
около 1300 солдат НАТО прибыло в Эстонию. Как Вы к этому относитесь? Почему? Вы 
поддерживаете присутствие войск НАТО в Эстонии? Почему? 
7. Whom do you consider as a NATO soldier? (Soldier from another country/ Estonian 
soldier). Кого вы считаете солдатом НАТО (Солдат иностранец/эстонский солдат). 
8. Do you consider that NATO is a threat to Russia? Вы считаете НАТО угрозой для 
России? 
9. If Estonia would be attacked by any country, do you consider armed resistance necessary? 
Would you personally be ready to defend Estonia in case of an armed conflict – according to 
your ability? Would you personally be ready to defend Estonia in case of armed conflict with 
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Russia? Если Эстония будет атакована любой страной, Вы считаете вооружённое 
сопротивление необходимым? Вы бы были готовы защищать Эстонию в меру своих 
возможностей в случае вооружённого конфликта? (В случае конфликта с Россией?) 
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